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INTRODUCTION
Modem economic analysis of contract law began about thirty years ago
and, many scholars would agree, has become the dominant academic style
of contract theory. Traditional doctrinal analysis exerts less influence than it
did prior to 1970 and enjoys little prestige. Philosophical work on the
nature of promising has captured some attention, but petered out in the
1980s, with little to show for the effort other than arid generalizations about
the nature of promising. Academic critiques from the left no longer stir up
excitement as they did twenty years ago. Scholarship influenced by
cognitive psychology has so far produced few insights. Only economic
analysis seems to be on solid footing.
One way to validate a field's claims is to look at its history.
Economically oriented scholars writing in the early 1970s had foundational
insights, and then over time subsequent writers have criticized and refined
them; because these refinements were derived from common premises,
there has been a sense of forward movement in the subject, of the building
of an increasingly sophisticated consensus. Although critics of economic
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analysis deride its scientific aspirations, the steady accumulation of insights
over time resembles scientific progress. Doctrinal, philosophical, and
critical scholarship by contrast has been static. The authors agree or
disagree, and about the same things, as much today as they did twenty or
thirty years ago.
Yet there are grounds for concern about the economic analysis of
contract law. Careful students of its history know that the sense of
convergence ended years ago; in the last ten years, theory has become
divergent, and impasses have emerged. The simple models that dominated
discussion prior to the 1990s do not predict observed contract doctrine. The
more complex models that emerged in the 1980s and dominated discussion
in the 1990s failed to predict doctrine or relied on variables that could not,
as a practical matter, be measured. As a result, the predictions of these
models are indeterminate, and the normative recommendations derived
from them are implausible.
For these reasons, I will argue that economic analysis has failed to
produce an "economic theory" of contract law, and does not seem likely to
be able to do so. By this, I mean that the economic approach does not
explain the current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis
for criticizing and reforming contract law. This is not to say that the
economic approach has not produced any wisdom, but that the nature of its
accomplishment turns out to be subtle and will become clear only after an
extended discussion.
This Essay has two purposes: to document the failures of economic
models to explain contract law or to justify reform, and to provide an
explanation for these failures. The explanation centers on the difficulty of
developing a model of contractual behavior that can be tested and that does
not make unreasonable assumptions about the cognitive abilities of
contractual parties.
At the outset, a few comments must be made in order to avoid some
possible misunderstandings of the argument. First, I will not argue that
some other approach to contract law is superior to the economic approach,
nor that economic analysis should be abandoned. If a moral must be
extracted from the discussion, it is skepticism about how much additional
value economics has to offer to understanding contract law today.
Second, I do not make claims about the value of economic analysis for
understanding other areas of law. Indeed, my critique rests on empirical and
methodological judgments about the contracts literature, judgments that do
not necessarily apply to, say, torts or property. Nor do I take a position in
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this Essay on controversies over the welfarist foundations of economic
analysis.'
Third, I want to avoid making general arguments about what counts as
a good theory. One might argue that any methodology that yields surprises
or insights about a familiar topic is valuable, and those surprises or insights
should be counted as theories. To avoid these philosophical issues, I will
focus on the original aspirations of the economic analysis of contract law:
to provide an explanation of existing legal rules, and to provide a basis for
criticizing or defending those rules.2
Finally, I want to avoid debates about what counts as "economic
analysis of contract law" by stipulating that it did not exist before 1970.
This is, of course, artificial. Many earlier scholars, including Holmes,
Llewellyn, Hale, and Fuller, used economic analysis in the sense that from
time to time they would assume that contracting parties are rational and
then speculate about how different legal rules would affect these parties'
incentives.3 From a modem perspective, however, their insights seem banal,
and that is because post-1970 economic analysis is more systematic and
careful. 4 The interesting question is whether the post-1970 commitment to
methodological individualism and the other premises of the rational actor
approach provide the basis for a theory that can be used to explain or
criticize contract law.
My plan is as follows. Part I describes various results from the
economic analysis of contract law and compares them with the legal
doctrine. In virtually every case, models make either false or indeterminate
predictions about the doctrines of contract law. Part II discusses the closely
related literature on incomplete contracts, a literature that attempts to
1. For a recent defense of the welfarist approach, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961 (2001).
2. This was recently described in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 26-29
(5th cd. 1998). As Ayres and Craswell point out, authors are more careful today about
"explaining" legal rules, but there is no doubt that these authors proffer such explanations
frequently, even where the normative project is emphasized. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 222 (3d ed. 2000) ("The courts reduce the costs of negotiating
contracts by supplying efficient default terms."); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1163
(arguing that notions of fairness have not "led us seriously astray" from welfare economics,
because "basic rules of damages do not seem to reflect such principles").
3. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE (1998); Avery
Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: A Positive
Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 541 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Introduction to
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at ix (Richard A. Posner cd., 1992); Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and
the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW 12 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
4. For defenses of the earlier work, see FRIED, supra note 3; and Herbert Hovenkamp, The
First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REv. 993 (1990). Fried and Hovenkamp
like the earlier work because it struggled with foundational issues and made liberal or progressive
recommendations. Although the importance of this scholarship in intellectual history cannot be
denied, its lack of continued vitality is almost certainly due to its failure to produce a tractable
methodology.
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predict the content of contracts, as opposed to contract law. The separation
of these two bodies of scholarship, now gradually disappearing, is an
accident of history, but useful for seeing the general problems with the
economic project. Part III speculates about what went wrong with economic
analysis and argues that an ambiguity at the heart of the concept of
transaction costs is to blame. Part IV looks at trends in contracts
scholarship. Part V criticizes alternative approaches to contract theory.
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW
A. Premises and Basic Results
The economic analysis of contract law is too familiar to warrant an
extended discussion; there are also several excellent surveys. 5 Fundamental
assumptions, common to nearly all efforts at economic analysis, are that
individuals have preferences over outcomes, that these preferences obey
basic consistency conditions, and that individuals satisfy these preferences
subject to an exogenous budget constraint. Contracts scholars usually
assume that individuals do not have preferences regarding the consumption
or well-being of other individuals, nor regarding contract doctrine itself-
there is no preference for expectation damages, for example.
6
The standard approach assumes that the parties enter a contract in order
to secure investment in a jointly beneficial project.7 The project could be as
simple as the sale of a good from Seller to Buyer-with one party (or both)
enhancing the gains by an investment that reduces the cost of production for
Seller or increases the value of the good for Buyer-or as complex as the
construction of a skyscraper. If Buyer can increase the value of the good by
making investments prior to delivery, Buyer will want a guarantee that
Seller will not increase the price after Seller has observed Buyer's reliance.
A contract can sometimes prevent Seller from holding up the Buyer in this
way, and thus permit Buyer to invest with knowledge that he will enjoy the
full return of his investment.
In their contracts, parties include terms describing performance and
governing the main contingencies that affect the value of performance.
5. See the relevant entries in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) and THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998). See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, chs. 6-7;
POSNER, supra note 2, ch. 4; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1102-64; Lewis A. Komhauser,
An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. RFV. 683
(1986).
6. This is not always true; scholarship on donative promises usually assumes that the
promisor cares about the well-being of the promisee. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status,
and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 567.
7. Another common rationale for entering a contract is risk sharing. See A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).
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Terms might describe the goods to be delivered, the date of delivery, or the
identity of the party that bears the risk of an accident during the shipment.
The terms might also release the seller from its obligation if a strike or
similar event occurs. A theoretically complete contract would describe all
the possible contingencies, but transaction costs--including the cost of
negotiating and writing down the terms-and foreseeing low-probability
events, render all contracts incomplete. In addition, parties might choose
some terms or avoid others for strategic reasons, in order to exploit superior
bargaining power or information asymmetries. Thus, contracts are usually
quite incomplete. Parties rely on custom, trade usage, and, in the end, the
courts to fill out the terms of the contract.
The terms that appear in contracts, then, depend on what the parties are
trying to accomplish, shared understandings about the relevant industry,
transaction costs, general characteristics of their interaction such as
asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power, and the background
legal regime. The last factor, the legal regime, is the focus of the economic
analysis of contract law. The question is, broadly speaking, what rules of
contract law would best serve the interests of the parties. This question is
asked in two different ways, depending on whether the scholar takes a
descriptive or a normative approach.
Descriptive analysis provides a "prediction" of contract doctrine. Built
into this approach is the assumption that judges decide cases (and/or choose
doctrine) in a manner that maximizes efficiency.8 The question why judges
would decide cases in this way, or whether it is necessary for them to do so
in order to generate efficient law, is bracketed.9 The author constructs a
model in which parties would maximize their utility if they could enter an
optimal contract. They cannot enter such a contract in the absence of legal
enforcement, so the question becomes what legal rule enables the parties to
enter the optimal contract. This hypothetical legal rule is then compared to
8. The models are usually written as though the concept of efficiency being used is Pareto
efficiency: The decisionmaker chooses the rule that maximizes the surplus from cooperation, and,
although this might involve the Kaldor-Hicks idea of transferring goods from the person who
values them less to the person who values them more, all people who use contracts are better off
with an efficient system because prices will reflect the risk of ex post transfers. To be sure, in
many cases prices will not adjust, and the transition from an inefficient rule to an efficient rule
would likely be a Kaldor-Hicks move, but these will usually be minor considerations.
9. A literature that analyzes this assumption is inconclusive. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H.
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). There is no reason why
the prediction must be that contract law is efficient; this seems to be an accident of intellectual
history. One could imagine a different theory, along the lines of public choice, that holds that
contract law reflects the self-interested decisions of judges to implement policy preferences.
Indeed, such an approach has been used by political scientists to explain judicial interpretation of
statutes and constitutional provisions. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
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actual legal rules, and, if they are the same, the descriptive hypothesis is
vindicated.
The normative position assumes that contract law should be efficient.
As before, the author constructs a model in which parties can increase their
welfare through a contract that is legally enforceable. The author first
shows the optimal outcome-where, for example, performance occurs only
when the buyer's valuation exceeds the seller's cost, and buyer and seller
make efficient investments-and then the equilibrium outcomes under
alternative legal rules. Typically, the author recommends one rule as
efficient, or shows that different rules are efficient under different
assumptions, or else criticizes various existing rules because they do not
enable the parties to achieve the optimal outcome.
In the following Sections, I will show the ways in which contract
doctrine diverges from the predictions of the descriptive hypotheses, and I
will show that the normative implications of the models are weak or
nonexistent. The reason for discussing normative and descriptive failures at
the same time is that the two are closely connected. From a descriptive
perspective, the models generate either false or indeterminate predictions.
From a normative perspective, the models generate either implausible or
indeterminate recommendations. The reason in both cases is that the
determinate models omit important variables, but including these variables
makes them indeterminate, or, in some cases, unrealistic, because they
place too great a burden on courts. The nature and origin of these
difficulties will become clearer as we examine the models.
B. Remedies
Much contract doctrine comprises background rules that parties can
change, albeit within limits. The victim of breach, by default, receives
expectation damages, but the parties can vary this outcome ex ante by
providing for liquidated damages in the contract. Their ability to contract
around the expectation damages rule in this way is circumscribed by the
penalty doctrine, which forbids liquidated damages that are unreasonably
high.
At an early stage, scholars argued that the default rule should maximize
the ex ante value of the contract. Expectation damages were said to have
this effect as a result of an attractive property: They give a party the
incentive to breach if and only if the cost of performance for the promisor
exceeds the value of performance for the promisee. Performance occurs if
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and only if it is efficient. For this reason, expectation damages seemed to be
the right measure of damages."
This conclusion was premature, however. First, the argument overlooks
the ability of the parties to renegotiate prior to performance. If renegotiation
costs are low enough, efficient performance will occur regardless of the
remedy. If the remedy is less than expectation damages and performance is
efficient, the promisee will bribe the promisor to perform. If the remedy is
greater than expectation damages and performance is inefficient, the
promisor will pay the promisee for a release.
Second, the argument overlooks the effect of the expectation measure
on other incentives. Consider the promisee's incentive to rely or invest in
anticipation of performance. Under the rule of expectation damages, the
promisee's reliance investment is fully compensated. But if the promisee
expects to recover the investment regardless of whether or not trade is
efficient, the promisee will overinvest-that is, he will invest as though the
return were certain rather than stochastic, externalizing the cost on the
promisor.'' A superior measure of damages would give the promisee the
amount of damages that would compensate the promisee if he engaged in
efficient reliance, not the amount that would compensate the promisee for
the loss given whatever level of reliance was taken.'
2
The concept of efficient investment is subtle, and a numerical example
might help. Suppose that Buyer and Seller enter a contract under which
Seller promises to supply goods that Buyer needs for his factory. Buyer can
increase the value of the goods for his use by investing in adjustments to the
factory prior to delivery. Let's say that if Buyer invests 0, his valuation of
the goods equals 100. If Buyer invests 5, his valuation of the goods equals
120. If Buyer invests 10, his valuation of the goods equals 128. If Buyer
will obtain the goods with certainty, then efficiency requires that he invest
10: 128 - 10 > 120 - 5 > 100 - 0. However, if Buyer will obtain the goods
with only a 50% probability, then efficiency requires that he invest 5:
0.5(120) - 5 > 0.5(128) - 10, and 0.5(120) - 5 > 0.5(100) - 0. A person
who invests money in some outcome will invest more if the outcome is
certain than if the outcome is uncertain. Because expectation damages
provide a return to the promisee whether or not breach is efficient, the
promisee will invest as though the yield of the investment would occur with
probability of 1 rather than with the probability (<1) that performance
10. John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach (if Contract, I J. LEGAL
STUD. 277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).
11. See William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39 (1984); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies
for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121 (1984).
12. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 14(1985).
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occurs. The promisee thus invests an amount greater than would be
efficient. 13
Third, the argument neglects the ability of the parties to design
remedial provisions for their contract. If expectation damages are optimal,
the parties can achieve the effect of this remedy by giving each side the
option to perform or pay an amount that is the function of revealed ex post
values. If expectation damages are not optimal, then the parties can choose
some superior remedy that would, for example, take account of reliance
incentives. These considerations suggest that specific performance of the
remedial portion of the contract would be efficient, not expectation
damages, which in essence convert the obligation to perform into an option
to perform or pay an amount determined by a court.
There are numerous other problems with expectation damages.
Expectation damages are also undesirable if courts have trouble
determining the parties' valuations at the time of breach. The better remedy
is specific performance, which a court can award without determining the
promisee's valuation.' 
4
Expectation damages are also undesirable when information is
asymmetric, unless highly specific conditions are met. Consider the Hadley
rule, according to which a victim of breach obtains compensation for
average, rather than actual, loss, unless he has revealed his valuation to the
promisor ex ante. 5 Thus, the shipper cannot recover fully compensatory
damages from a carrier who has breached the shipment contract if the
shipper does not reveal the specially high value of the goods shipped. The
Hadley rule gives the shipper an incentive to disclose his valuation prior to
contracting, so that the carrier will take optimal precautions given the
shipment's value.
But it turns out that the argument can be reversed. Imagine an
expansive liability rule that gave the victim of breach actual damages (that
is, expectation damages). The defense of Hadley implicitly assumed that
under the expansive liability rule the high-value shipper would not have an
incentive to reveal his valuation: If he is to be fully compensated, he has no
13. For another example, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
EcONOMIcs 32-35 (1983).
14. Kronman argues that the common law efficiently reserves specific performance for
disputes involving valuation problems such as those involving unique goods. See Anthony
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978). Schwartz points out that
information problems about valuation, enforcement, and so forth are always present, and therefore
specific performance should be the default rule. See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). The
two remedies also have different effects on reliance incentives. See Shavell, supra note 11. But,
the simplest defense of specific performance is that if parties are rational, they will design an
optimal contract, and courts should enforce their terms rather than give the parties an option
(expectation damages) when they did not bargain for it.
15. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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reason to reveal his valuation, which would enable the carrier to charge a
higher price. But the expansive liability rule does give the low-value
shipper the incentive to reveal his valuation. If he does not, he will be
charged ex ante for average compensation, but he would prefer to be
charged a lower price, even if this means that the carrier will take less care.
If the low-value shippers reveal their valuation, then the carrier can infer
that any shipper that does not reveal his valuation must have a high
valuation. Both the Hadley rule and its opposite give parties incentives to
disclose private information.
Authors who have pursued this argument point out that one rule could
be better than the other, depending on the distribution of valuations, the cost
of revealing information, the relative bargaining power of the party with
private information and the uninformed party, and related factors. If there
are more low-value shippers than high-value shippers, the expansive
liability rule requires more bargaining around, and therefore more
transaction costs, and thus might be suboptimal. 16 But the relevant variables
are too complex and too hard to determine. We do not observe doctrine
incorporating them, nor do we have enough empirical data to be able to
guess which rule is based on assumptions that are closer to reality.
17
16. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the
Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
284 (1991); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis
of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1299-300 (1980); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Louis E. Wolcher,
Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, in 12
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (Richard 0. Zerbe ed., 1989).
17. For further epicycles, see Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999) (showing that the results of earlier models change if the
high type is likely, rather than certain, to suffer a large loss the event of breach). Adler overstates
his argument as a critique of Hadley v. Baxendale when, in fact, he just shows that courts must
take into account yet another factor when determining the optimal rule. More to the point is his
skepticism about the possibility that lawmakers could take into account the factors that he
identifies when formulating doctrine. Id. at 1582. As Bebchuk and Shavell observe in their reply,
"Adler does not note any reasons for assuming that the consideration that he discusses involves
less practical problems for lawmakers than the considerations on which our analysis has focused."
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive
To Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1615, 1627 (1999). Adler does seem to realize that the
accumulating complexities of the analysis undermine its practical value for lawmakers. Bebchuk
and Shavell, by contrast, state:
[O]ur analysis of Hadley enables one to recommend that rule with greater confidence
than researchers are often able to endorse other legal rules in other contexts. As we
explained in some detail, it seems that the Hadley rule is clearly desirable for cases
(such as Hadley itself) in which a minority of buyers has valuations of performance that
are substantially higher than the valuations of ordinary buyers.
Id. at 1625. But they do not provide a reason for believing that any of the relevant factors are
measurable in general conditions, and one cannot evaluate their historical claim without further
evidence.
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There are other considerations as well. The remedy that is chosen will
affect the incentive of each party to search for the optimal partners prior to
contracting, to reveal private information about the probability that
performance will be possible, to take precautions against breach, and to
renegotiate after information is revealed about the state of the world.
8
Remedies will also affect the ability of the parties to shift risk in a contract
when one or both parties are risk-averse. And, as I discuss below, remedies
affect the ability of the contracting parties to take advantage of third parties
who come onto the scene after the parties have entered the contract and
value performance more than either of the contracting parties.
Articles that discuss these various incentives typically bracket most of
them for the purpose of analysis and focus on one or two. As a result, the
optimal remedy derived from a model is optimal only under narrow
conditions. If we are to put the models together and try to draw from them
as a group their prediction about contract law, we could take two
approaches.
First, we could argue that the models collectively show that different
remedies are optimal under different conditions and therefore predict that
contract law should incorporate these conditions in doctrine. For example,
contract law will make expectation damages the remedy when the parties
can make choices only about breach or performance and not about how
much to invest. But there are two problems with this approach. The first of
these problems is that contract law does not resemble the predictions of the
models. Awarding expectation damages is the general rule in contract law,
but this rule can be justified by the models only under narrow conditions.
Furthermore, doctrine does not make the application of expectation
damages turn on variables identified by the models, such as the degree of
reliance by the promisee. The second of these problems is that the models
taken together are probably indeterminate. To generate predictions, one
would need a vast amount of information about the characteristics of the
parties and the transactions. If one remedy is best when renegotiation costs
are high, and another is best when renegotiation costs are low, we need
some way to measure renegotiation costs. If the optimal remedy depends on
the shape of probability distributions for sellers' costs and buyers'
valuations, we need this information as well. Yet no one has attempted to
collect this information, and it is difficult to imagine how this task could be
accomplished.
Under the second approach, we could argue that the models collectively
show that one particular remedial structure-the existing doctrine of
contract law-is optimal given the "average" circumstances of the parties.
18. For a clear discussion, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the
Theorv of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
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We might think, for example, that on average pre-performance investment
is not a significant issue, or, if it is, it is adequately controlled by the
doctrine of mitigation.' 9 The rule of expectation damages is optimal
because the perform-or-breach decision matters most, with specific
performance reserved for cases where valuation problems are
insurmountable. But this view is unsupported by any evidence.
C. Contract Interpretation
Many contract disputes turn on questions of interpretation. Seller
delivers the goods, but Buyer argues that the goods do not conform to the
requirements of the contract. Suppose the contract says "chicken," and the
delivery is a scrawny, stewing chicken. Buyer says that "chicken" refers to
a plump, juicy broiler; Seller says that the word just identifies the species
and leaves the quality of the bird to Seller's discretion. 0 How should the
court resolve this dispute?
Economists have proposed a number of interpretive strategies for
courts.2 One is to choose a "majoritarian default," the meaning that most
parties to chicken contracts would use, which will often be the same as the
customary meaning or trade usage. If parties expect that courts will apply a
majoritarian default when disputes arise over the meaning of the contract,
they will know that most of the time the court will choose the term that
maximizes the probability of efficient trade. Accordingly, they would be
more willing to enter a contract in the first place, despite high transaction
costs, than they would under an alternative rule. Choosing a majoritarian
default rule reduces the negative consequences of high transaction costs.
Another strategy is to choose a "penalty default," a meaning that most
parties to chicken contracts would not use.22 This strategy, which would
give parties an incentive to write a less ambiguous contract than they might
otherwise, has two motivations. First, it discourages parties from
externalizing the cost of interpreting the contract on the courts. If parties
were clearer, courts would have less work to do. Second, it discourages
parties from opportunistically concealing information from each other. If
one party knows about the ambiguity of the word "chicken" and prefers the
majoritarian meaning, and the other party does not know about the
ambiguity, then the first party would have no incentive to disclose the
19. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983).
20. Cf Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (holding that the broad meaning of "chicken" is correct).
21. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
321 (1985).
22. Ayres & Gertner, Fillings Gaps, supra note 16, at 95.
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ambiguity to the second, unless a penalty default rule held the informed
party to the less favorable meaning.
A third strategy is to enforce the contract in a literalistic way. If the
party says "chicken" and the dictionary or common sense definition of
"chicken" has a general meaning, then Seller has the right to deliver the
stewing chicken. The court does not try to determine what most parties
mean by "chicken," or what most parties do not mean. This strategy, like
the penalty default strategy, gives the parties an incentive to be clear, or at
least to anticipate how courts normally interpret terms.
A final strategy is for the court to enforce whatever term would be
efficient in the particular case. One can derive this term by asking the
question: Supposing that transaction costs had been zero at the time of
contracting, what would the parties have done? Buyer and Seller would
have anticipated their dispute about the meaning of "chicken" and either
chosen a more precise term (if trade is still efficient) or not made a deal (if
trade is not efficient). What they would have done depends on the costs and
values of the various birds. The difference between this strategy and the
majoritarian default is the difference between a standard and a rule. The
court chooses whatever is efficient for the contract in dispute, rather than
enforcing whatever term is efficient for the majority of parties who enter
similar or identical contracts.
We have already examined a model comparing the first and second
strategy, namely, Ayres and Gertner's model of the Hadley rule.23 The
Hadley rule, in Ayres and Gertner's argument, plays the role of a penalty
default, for they assume that a majority of buyers prefer unlimited liability,
which would thus serve as a majoritarian default. Choosing between limited
liability and unlimited liability when the contract does not specify one or
the other is like choosing between the ordinary meaning of chicken and a
narrow meaning of chicken when the contract does not define the term. The
choice between these two meanings depends on the same factors that
determine the efficiency of the Hadley rule: the cost of bargaining around
the default rule, the distribution of valuations in the population of buyers,
the market power of the seller, the degree to which the seller's performance
would improve with superior information, and other factors that are not
likely within the grasp of a decisionmaker. Thus, the indeterminacy that
afflicts the Hadley analysis undermines any effort to choose between a
majoritarian and penalty default.
For this reason, one might argue that courts should engage in literalistic
enforcement. Indeed, Schwartz makes just such an argument, claiming that
the responsibility for choosing default rules puts an unrealistically high
23. Id. at 101.
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informational burden on the courts.2 4 Literalism, by contrast, allows parties
to direct courts to enforce obligations that arise under conditions that the
courts can verify. But although it is true that literalism does put a lighter
burden on courts, it does not follow that literalism is superior to the
majoritarian (or penalty) approach. The choice between the two approaches
is, as Schwartz acknowledges, an empirical question about which we have
no evidence. 25 The most significant problem with Schwartz's analysis,
however, is that it depends on the methodological assumption that cognitive
limitations do not exist or are minimal. The majoritarian approach depends
on the assumption that parties fail to anticipate the future; Schwartz simply
assumes the opposite.
This point can also be made about Schwartz's criticism of the view that
courts should choose the term that is most efficient in the particular case.
Schwartz argues that if the evidence necessary to choose such terms ex post
is verifiable, then parties will bargain to the efficient result, in which case
judicial intervention is not necessary.26 In our example, the parties will
trade the chicken only if the buyer values it more than the seller does, so
that if the buyer accepts the stewing chicken, the ex post interpretation of
the contract is effectively that the general meaning of chicken holds. If the
evidence is not verifiable, and indeed not observable either, they might
bargain to an impasse, or to an inefficient term, in which case courts cannot
help. However, if the parties are boundedly rational-again, outside
Schwartz's model-we do not know how they would bargain with each
other, and therefore whether a court could improve on the outcome.
Let me summarize. From a descriptive perspective, we can distinguish
two bodies of work. The standard economic analysis of default rules is
broadly consistent with judicial practices; courts employ a mix of
majoritarian and penalty defaults. But it does no more than rationalize these
practices, for there is no way to measure the variables that determine the
relative efficiency of the rules. Schwartz's argument, which is simpler and
truer to economic premises, fails to account for courts' refusal (for the most
part) to rely on the literalistic approach.27
From a normative perspective, Schwartz's argument that courts should
engage in literalistic interpretation should appeal to those steeped in
24. Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 416 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 277, 280 [hereinafter
Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts]; see also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 875 (2000).
25. Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 24, at 280.
26. Id. at 282.
27. Cf Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992). In this earlier article,
Schwartz argued that courts interpret contracts aggressively when bargaining defects exist and
when the interpretation can be justified on the basis of verifiable information.
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economics, but the appeal derives from the methodological decision to treat
individuals as rational and courts as hampered by information
asymmetries.
28
D. Unconscionability and Consumer Protection
The premises of economics push in the direction of freedom of
contract, and this current can be resisted only with difficulty. If parties are
rational, they will enter contracts only when it is in their self-interest, and
they will agree only to terms that make them better off. Courts that refused
to enforce these terms would make it more difficult for future parties to use
contracts to enhance their joint well-being. Therefore, courts should enforce
the terms of the contract.
And yet courts do not always enforce the terms of contracts. They often
refuse to enforce terms that seem harsh, oppressive, or improper: strict
liquidated damages provisions, expansive security arrangements, alienation
of the equity of redemption, restrictive arbitration provisions, broad
covenants not to compete, wagers, choice-of-forum clauses and disclaimers
of warranties in fine print or confusing language, and even price terms that
seem too high or too low. Some of these practices derive from statutes (for
example, usury laws); others arose in equity or the common law. The
catchall term is unconscionability, but the relatively unusual application of
this doctrine by courts only deflects attention from the widespread judicial
scrutiny of transactions involving consumers, much of it in the form of
interpretive presumptions that can interfere as much with freedom of
contract as prohibitions do.
Economics has been better at deflating standard explanations for
unconscionability and related doctrines than at explaining these doctrines.
Let me say a few words about these standard explanations.
1. Unequal Bargaining Power
Courts sometimes say that a contract is unconscionable because of the
unequal bargaining power of the seller and buyer. It is not always clear
what courts mean when they use this term, but the closest economic
concept is that of market or monopoly power. A seller has market power if
it can increase the price of the good above its marginal cost by restricting
supply. As is well known, such behavior is inefficient in the Kaldor-Hicks
sense, and forcing the seller to sell at marginal cost would in theory
eliminate a deadweight cost.
28. For a parallel argument, see infra Section ll.B.
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Nonetheless, economists typically argue that courts should not avoid
contracts because of the unequal bargaining power of the parties. When
contracts appear to have very high price terms, a court could determine only
with great difficulty whether the high price is due to market power or
fluctuations in the costs of inputs. A high interest rate, for example, could
result from the creditor's judgment about the risk of default posed by a
particular debtor, and generally courts should defer to such judgments. A
determination that the creditor has market power requires an evaluation of
the structure of the market, a notoriously difficult enterprise usually
reserved for antitrust litigation. A seller or creditor with temporary market
power as a result of a patent, or some innovation that other market
participants have not had a chance to imitate, should (arguably) be
permitted to reap above-market returns, for that is how innovation is
encouraged in a market economy.
When contracts appear to have harsh nonprice terms, there is another
reason for thinking that these terms are unobjectionable. Even if the seller
or creditor has market power, it has the right incentive to supply the terms
that parties desire. For example, a debtor might be willing to consent to a
harsh remedial term in return for a low interest rate. 9 And a supplier might
be willing to give the buyer the power to terminate the contract with little
notice, if that is the only way to get the buyer's business. The party with
market power will supply terms if the other parties want them and will
charge them a fee, but will not force terms on parties that do not want them,
for generally the most efficient way to exploit market power is through the
price term. 30 Although there are models in which a combination of market
power and asymmetric information can result in inefficient terms, they
justify nonenforcement only under complex and hard-to-identify
conditions.' 3
These theories do not describe what courts do. Courts permit the
harshness of nonprice, and occasionally price, terms to influence them, and
they seem to attach significance to unequal bargaining power. For this
reason, most economic work is cast as a normative critique of the judicial
practice.
29. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
305-06 (1975).
30. Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1071-76 (1977); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1458
(1983).
31. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 666-71 (1979). For a
discussion of the literature in the context of consumer finance, see Richard Hynes & Eric A.
Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002).
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2. Lack of Information
Courts sometimes say that a contract is unconscionable because one
party, usually a consumer, lacks sophistication. Lack of sophistication is not
the same thing as lack of information, but lack of information does seem to
play a role in the cases. When terms are harsh and complex or hard to read,
and consumers are unsophisticated, courts often express doubt that the
consumers understood their obligations under the contract. This has led
economists to investigate the role of information deficiencies in contract
enforcement.
The topic is too complex to discuss here in any detail, but let me make
a few observations. Consumers who lack information have incentives to
acquire information. Some consumers will acquire information more easily
than others; these are the people who read Consumer Reports. But the other
consumers can free-ride on the efforts of the first group. If sellers cannot
easily distinguish informed and uninformed consumers, they cannot exploit
the latter by charging them a higher price. Thus, information deficiency
alone does not justify judicial intervention.
32
In addition, sellers have incentives to provide information to otherwise
uninformed consumers. If seller X has lower costs than seller Y, and thus
can charge lower prices and obtain a profit, X will invest in advertising in
order to attract consumers from Y. There are limits, however, to the amount
of information X will provide. If X's cars are cheaper than Y's cars, X has
the right incentives; but if X knows that its cars in general are more
dangerous than consumers believe, X has no incentive to provide that
information. 33 Supplying such information is costly, both intrinsically and
in the form of lost sales, and X does not internalize the benefits when he
honestly warns of the dangers of automobile travel and consumers refrain
from buying cars and avoid being injured.34
3. Summary
In sum, a simple model of the consumer-goods market implies that
courts should not use the unconscionability doctrine to strike down
contracts. More complex models suggest that courts should ignore
bargaining power or should take it into account only under narrow
conditions. Yet courts frequently criticize the inequality of bargaining
32. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 30, at 1422-23.
33. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491,505-06 (1981).
34. X's incentives are suboptimal even if cars are safer, rather than more dangerous, than
consumers think because X would not internalize gains to Y that would result if X revealed this
information to consumers. Monopolists might gain more from information disclosure than
competitors, but there are further complications. See id. at 507-08.
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power between consumer and seller, imply that this fact may justify
avoidance of the contract, and do not elaborate any further on the question
of why bargaining power matters in some cases but not others. Other
models suggest that courts might improve information asymmetries when
consumers do not engage in enough comparison shopping or when
competitive pressures do not force sellers to reveal information. Yet courts
rarely pay attention to these factors when applying the unconscionability
doctrine.
E. Mistake
In some circumstances, courts avoid contracts that are the result of
mistakes. If the parties committed a mutual mistake as to a basic
assumption of the contract, or if one party committed a mistake that the
other party could have detected, the adversely affected party will sometimes
have the right to avoid the contract.
In theory, parties could design contracts that released one or both
parties who made a mistake. Consider a contract between Buyer and Seller
for the sale of a cow.35 Buyer and Seller might believe that the cow is
barren when in fact she is fertile, in which case Seller will want to avoid the
contract. Or Buyer and Seller might believe that the cow is healthy when in
fact she is ill, in which case Buyer will want to avoid the contract. In either
event, the parties can design the contract accordingly. The parties could
enter a contract giving the Seller the right to withdraw from the contract if
the cow proves to be fertile, or make performance contingent on subsequent
confirmation that the cow is barren. And in the second case, Seller could
give Buyer a warranty against illness or not, depending on how they want to
allocate the risk. The general point is that if parties are rational, they know
that they can make mistakes, and they will design the contract in a way that
assigns this risk in the appropriate manner.
One might respond that because the parties are, by hypothesis,
mistaken, it does not occur to them to build these contingencies into the
contract. This is what courts mean when they say that the mistake was
about a basic assumption of the contract. But rational parties always know
that something could happen that makes performance more or less costly to
Seller, and more or less valuable to Buyer. It could be that the cow has a
hidden characteristic, good or bad; it could be that market conditions will
change, so that a cow gains or loses value relative to other goods. From an
economic perspective, there is nothing special about the cow being fertile or
ill, nothing that distinguishes this contingency from a change in the price
35. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
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caused by a shift in market conditions. Parties can design contracts that take
account of all these contingencies.
If this argument is correct, there is no reason for courts to release
parties when one or both of them make mistakes. It would be like releasing
an insurance company from a fire-insurance contract on the ground that the
insurance company mistakenly believed that a fire would not occur. From
an economic perspective, parties cannot make mistakes: They have
probability distributions that reflect information they have about the world.
They know that they do not possess the absolute truth and would not
believe otherwise.
36
In order to explain the mistake doctrines, then, we need to make
additional assumptions. One possible assumption, which by now should be
familiar, is that "transaction costs" prevent parties from designing optimal
contracts. This is the implicit route taken by Rasmusen and Ayres in an
article on the mistake doctrines. 37 Before we turn to their argument, we
should observe that using this assumption makes the analysis of the mistake
doctrine the same as the analysis of any problem of contractual
interpretation, where, as law and economics assumes, transaction costs
prevent parties from defining a crucial term, like "chicken" in the
Frigahment case. The parties do not make a "mistake" in the ordinary sense
of the term; they rationally choose to leave a contract incomplete in light of
the costs of completing it. If one thinks that courts should use majoritarian
defaults to determine such terms, then one should think that majoritarian
defaults should also determine the parties' obligations if the cow is fertile or
ill. On this view, the mistake doctrine should also have the same remedial
implications as contract-interpretation disputes-namely, enforcement of
the judicial interpretation rather than rescission and restitution-but of
course it does not.
To evaluate the mutual and unilateral mistake doctrines, Rasmusen and
Ayres assume that parties can set a price but that they cannot make
performance contingent on the occurrence of the desired states of the world
(either directly or through the use of an optimal incomplete contract). It is
in this sense that they operationalize the concept of mistake, taking their
cue from the work on contract interpretation. Seller expects an average cost
to perform, c, and Buyer expects an average valuation, v, such that v > c, on
average, but in some states of the world v < c, and trade should not occur.
Ayres and Rasmusen investigate the question whether the mistake doctrine
should release the parties from the contract (presumably, at the request of
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
36. Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 309,315 & n.13 (1993).
37. Id. at 315.
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Buyer if the price is higher than his realized valuation, or of Seller if the
price is lower than her realized cost).
Their analysis is complex, so let me focus on their conclusions for
mutual mistake. The doctrine, by excusing performance when both parties
are uninformed or mistaken, would seem to create incentives for parties to
avoid performance and to gather information. The question is whether these
incentives are efficient.
One possible advantage of the mutual mistake doctrine is that it enables
the parties to avoid a second transaction in order to reverse the initial
contract when it turns out that v < c. But the reversal will occur only when
both parties are also uninformed; if one party is informed, then the other
party cannot avoid an inefficient contract by claiming mutual mistake.
Further, the doctrine enables either party to avoid the contract when
(despite the mistake) v > c: Buyer will avoid the contract when the price
p > v, and Seller will avoid the contract when p < c.38 If you permit parties
to breach without paying damages, then inefficient breach will result.
The mutual mistake doctrine also affects the parties' incentives to
gather information prior to entering contracts. But it does not affect the
incentives in a desirable way. Suppose that parties can acquire information
about the value of the good at some cost. If the acquisition of information
does not increase the value of the good, and the cost of acquiring
information is high enough, the mutual mistake doctrine properly
encourages the parties to remain ignorant but also results in too many
rescissions. When the cost of information is lower, the mutual mistake
doctrine encourages each party to acquire information in order to prevent
the other party from invoking mutual mistake, even though the additional
information does not increase the value of the good. On the other hand, if
the acquisition of information does increase the value of the good, then the
mutual mistake doctrine gives too little incentive to acquire information,
compared to a rule of enforcement.39
The mutual mistake doctrine is hard to reconcile with economic
premises, both because the doctrine by its terms appeals to cognitive errors
excluded from economic analysis, and because the doctrine encourages
behavior that would be suboptimal if people did not make those errors, as
economics assumes.4 ° But even putting aside cognitive errors, Ayres and
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 331-32.
40. Indeed, most contracts scholarship on information asymmetries assumes that the parties
know about their information advantage or disadvantage and make a strategic decision to reveal
information, demand a price adjustment, refuse to enter a contract, and so forth. The articles
usually focus on the proper damages remedy given these assumptions. In this context, Rasmusen
and Ayres's argument can be understood as an investigation of the conditions under which a "zero
damages" rule would be superior to expectation damages and alternative rules. For examples of
this literature, see Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J.
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Rasmusen do not offer a clear replacement for the mutual mistake doctrine.
They show that other doctrines, such as no excuse and unilateral mistake,
dominate mutual mistake in different contexts, but not that one of these
doctrines or some alternative would be optimal in general, nor that a court
could distinguish the conditions-whether, for example, acquisition of
information would increase the value of a good or not-under which the
different rules have advantages.
F. Impossibility
Courts sometimes release promisors from performance when
performance is "impossible" or "impracticable." Posner and Rosenfield
argue that these doctrines efficiently shift risk from the promisor when the
promisor is more risk-averse than the promisee. 41 Suppose a seller cannot
insure itself against a strike by its workforce, but that the buyer can easily
arrange for deliveries from alternative sellers if supply from the first is cut
off. If the seller subsequently cannot make deliveries because of a strike, a
court might excuse the seller from its contractual obligations on the grounds
of impossibility, with the real reason being that buyer could have insured
against this contingency more easily than the seller could have.
Subsequent work casts doubt on this argument. First, Posner and
Rosenfield's argument neglects the other incentives of the parties. If the
seller' pays no damages or a limited amount like restitution, it has no
incentive to perform when it is efficient to do so. The argument assumes
that the court can determine whether the cost of performance exceeds its
value to the buyer. But in other contexts, the justification of expectation
damages, for example, it is assumed that the court cannot make this
42determination.
Second, and more important, the impossibility and impracticability
doctrines do not spread risk in the efficient way. To see why, imagine a
risk-averse seller and a risk-neutral buyer. The optimal resolution of a
LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989) (analyzing the effect of damages rules on the promisor's incentive to
disclose private information about the probability of performancc); Richard Craswell,
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988)
(analyzing the effect of damages rules on the parties' incentives to acquire information, prior to
contracting, about their ability to perform); Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium
Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, . Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979)
(analyzing the effect of damages rules on parties' incentives to search for contract partners); and
Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. EcON. 20
(1994) (analyzing the effect of disclosure rules on the incentive to acquire and disclose
information).
41. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
42. See Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A
Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 360 (1988).
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dispute will place all the risk on Buyer; in effect, the court writes an
insurance policy of which Seller is the beneficiary. Such an insurance
policy would give Seller the same payoff in both states of the world-the
breach state and the performance state. The impossibility and
impracticability doctrines, however, do no such thing. They, at best, give
Seller a zero payoff in the breach state (and less if Seller has incurred some
costs or must make restitution), instead of giving Seller some amount
between zero and its profits. Indeed, the risk-sharing argument implies that
in some cases Seller should pay negative damages, something which is, of
course, never observed.43
The excuse doctrines are hard to understand from the economic
perspective. Sophisticated parties know that contingencies might occur that
will make performance impossible or extremely costly. If they want to
share the risk of these contingencies, they can write excuses into the
contract. We observe this behavior not just in the use of force majeure
clauses; excuses are frequently built into the central terms of the contract.
Insurance contracts contain exclusions; ordinary sales contracts shift risk by
tying the price to market indices. Firms can buy general insurance policies,
or self-insure, and are usually risk-neutral with respect to run-of-the-mill
contracts. It might be true that the cost of describing the parties' obligations
prevents parties from assigning all the risks, but it remains doubtful that
courts have the information necessary to repair the insurance market.
G. Consideration and Promissory Estoppel
Economics assumes that people exchange promises when both benefit
from the exchange, but it does not follow that the law should enforce all
promises. Courts make errors, and legal sanctions are sometimes clumsier
than nonlegal sanctions. As a result, people who make and receive promises
often do not expect, and would not want, courts to provide legal remedies if
the promisor breaks the promise. But when the promisor wants the promise
to be legally enforceable, and the promisee expects the promise to be
44legally enforceable, courts should enforce promises.
43. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best
World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 48 (1990); White, supra note 42, at 375; see also Victor P.
Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORFTICAL ECON. 100
(1988) (expressing skepticism about the risk-sharing aspect); Polinsky, supra note 7 (arguing that
endorsement of liquidated damages is the optimal remedy for risk sharing); George G. Triantis,
Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992) (criticizing the excuse doctrines).
44. This conclusion excludes the possibility of a market failure. One might also stipulate a de
minimis requirement: Courts should not enforce promises when the cost to the legal system
exceeds the gains to the parties. Charging the litigants a fee would be a better response.
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Economics, then, implies that courts should enforce promises when
parties want their promises to be enforceable, and not otherwise. Consistent
with this view, courts both routinely enforce promises and respect terms of
agreements that disclaim legal enforceability.
45
But these simple ideas do not explain the main doctrines that draw a
line between the legally enforceable promise and the unenforceable
promise, namely, the consideration and promissory estoppel doctrines.
The consideration doctrine holds that a court cannot enforce a promise
if it was not exchanged for "consideration," a legal benefit to the promisor
or detriment to the promisee (or, in the modem formulation, a promise or
performance that was bargained for). In essence, the doctrine knocks out of
court promises that are not part of a quid pro quo. Such promises include
option contracts, promises to give a gift, and open-ended agreements that
bind one party but not the other.
Yet these promises are unobjectionable from an economic perspective.
An option contract-for example, a promise to keep open an offer to sell
something while the offeree investigates its value-might be the only way
to attract the interest of a prospective purchaser. A promise to give a gift
enables the promisee to rely in anticipation of receiving the benefit and
enables the promisor to defer performance until the funds or goods are
acquired. Open-ended contracts-where, for example, one side commits
itself to purchase goods produced by the other side-are often efficient
methods for shifting risk, with the legally unconstrained party bound by
reputational concerns and nonlegal sanctions.
46
The courts, possibly because they recognize the force of these
arguments, have whittled down the consideration doctrine. Its main
function is now to deny enforcement of promises to give gifts. 47 The
consideration doctrine also serves, under the Restatement, as a formality:
Options are unenforceable unless the parties "recite" consideration. 48 But
there is no reason to require parties to recite a consideration as opposed to
reciting that they want their option to be enforceable. The same can be said
for Holmes's argument that the consideration doctrine was always just a
formality, so gift promises would be enforced if the promisee gave nominal
consideration to the promisor.49 Efforts to rationalize this practice as a way
45. See, e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989).
46. See Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1149-50 (1981).
47. The exception for charitable gifts only complicates the puzzle. If promises to give gifts
are socially desirable, then the exception makes sense, but the general unenforceability of gift
promises does not; if promises to give gifts are not socially desirable, then the exception does not
make sensc.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
49. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 294-95 (Little, Brown & Co. 1946)
(1881); see also Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941)
(criticizing Holmes's argument).
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of ensuring that courts can distinguish enforceable and unenforceable
promises fail because they do not explain the "form" of the formality.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel might seem consistent with
economics because it does not forbid courts to enforce value-enhancing
gratuitous promises. The doctrine does place a limit on the enforcement of
promises, however, and that limit is the requirement of promisee reliance.
This limit is not consistent with economics. If a person wants to make a
gratuitous promise, it must be because he wants to make the promisee better
off. The promisor can make the promisee better off regardless of whether
the promisee relies on the promise or can be proved to have done so.
Economic analysis therefore suggests that enforceability of a promise
should not depend on whether the promisee relied, or relied reasonably.
50
Promissory estoppel can also be understood as a device for relaxing the
consideration doctrine's prohibition on liability for precontractual reliance.
Parties often spend some time negotiating the terms of a contract before
entering it; frequently, one or both parties will make investments during this
period in anticipation of the eventual success of the negotiations. An
example is the relationship between a franchisor and a franchise applicant,
which can extend for months or years before the granting of the franchise.
51
During this time, the franchisor might require the applicant to acquire
experience as an employee in another franchise business, or undergo
training. To induce the applicant to make these investments of time and
effort, the franchisor might make vague or contingent promises that the
franchise will be awarded. Even when these promises are not definite
enough to form contractual commitments, applicants who are not awarded
the contract can sometimes obtain damages for their reliance costs, on the
basis of promissory estoppel.
Several scholars have considered the possibility that promissory
estoppel is efficient because it protects the promisee's investment.5 2 This
view is at first sight attractive because the promisor's behavior, when not
justified by the discovery that the promisee is unfit, seems opportunistic. In
theory, the promisor can hold up the promisee after the promisee has
invested and demand from the promisee additional fees or obligations that
extract all the surplus generated from the promisee's investment.
But if courts could reliably verify the promisee's behavior, and thus
distinguish the promisee who proves merely to be unfit and the promisee
who is the victim of holdup, then the parties could enter a contract at the
50. See Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 401, 420 & n.24 (1991).
51. E.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
52. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 489-
95 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?: The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in
Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1270-77 (1996).
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beginning of their relationship, one that specified what the promisee must
invest and how the promisee will be evaluated. As far as I know, parties do
not enter such contracts, presumably because they do not believe that courts
can make these distinctions.5 3 But if courts cannot, then the use of
promissory estoppel to protect reliance is not justified.
In addition, an efficient promissory estoppel doctrine would not require
courts to compensate all of the promisee's reliance. If it did so, promisees
would overinvest in reliance. Courts would need to determine how much
reliance is efficient in each case, and then award damages only equal to
efficient reliance, undercompensating parties that rely too much, or-not
compensating them at all. The proper award would depend on such factors
as the cost of, and return on, investment; the probability that the preliminary
relationship would yield a franchise; 54 and the parties' incentives to reveal
information to each other.
55
Craswell studied a group of cases in which equitable estoppel or
promissory estoppel arguments were advanced by offerees in order to
prevent an offeror from withdrawing an offer, and found that courts were
more likely to rule in favor of the offeree when reliance on the offer is
efficient.5 6 But he disclaims any intention to show that the outcomes of the
cases are themselves efficient, for just the reasons given above: "[T]here are
several factors other than the efficiency of [the offeree's] reliance that can
affect the desirability of a commitment." 57 The methodological difficulty of
showing that contract doctrine is efficient dissuades Craswell from making
the attempt.
H. Summary: Descriptive Versus Normative Failure
The charge of descriptive failure will not surprise scholars familiar with
the literature on economic analysis of contract law. The inefficiency of
contract law is a theme of Shavell, Goetz and Scott, and Schwartz on
expectation damages; Epstein and Schwartz on the unconscionability
doctrine; Ayres and Rasmusen on the mistake doctrine; Sykes and White on
53. In response to the growth of precontracrual liability, franchisors now require franchise
applicants to sign waivers.
54. See Craswell, supra note 52, at 499-501; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omni Ben-
Shahar, Precontractual Liability, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Jason Scott Johnston,
Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85
VA. L. REv. 385 (1999); Katz, supra note 52.
55. Avery Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 425, 429-30.
56. Craswell, supra note 52, at 531-36.
57. Id. at 507.
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the impossibility doctrine; Craswell on promissory estoppel; and others.
8
None of the authors goes so far as to deny that contract law is efficient.
Each examines only a small slice of contract law, and normal
methodological practice cautions against making exaggerated claims. But
for the observer who looks at the steady accumulation of failures over thirty
years, the conclusion is inescapable.
Some readers might agree with Ayres and Craswell that since most law-
and-economics authors do not claim that they explain doctrine, and instead
make normative recommendations, it is not worth making too much of this
failure. Perhaps not, but I do not think that the distinction between
descriptive and normative scholarship is so clear. The doctrinal structure of
contract law exerts force on the scholarly analysis. That is why so many
authors try to rationalize the doctrine, or propose incremental changes,
rather than coming to the austere conclusions of Schwartz and others
influenced by the incomplete contracts perspective. Courts and legislatures
are more likely to pay attention to scholarly recommendations that follow
naturally from the logic of contract law, than those that float down from the
ether, for courts and legislatures have no good reason-no economic crisis,
no foreign contract-law system that is clearly superior, no chorus of
complaints like those heard about the tort system-to think that there is
anything wrong with the system of contract law that we have. When
economics was able to keep the descriptive and normative together, when it
was able to say that contract law was essentially efficient but for some
tweaking here and there, it had the potential to influence decisionrmakers,
for it worked with the past, not against it, and did not force decisionmakers
to reject the past on the basis of conjectures founded on empirical postulates
that could not be verified.
The descriptive failure of the models takes two forms. Simple models,
which examine only one or two margins of contractual behavior, fail to
predict contract law as it exists. The other models are more complex
because they examine a greater variety of behavior, or because they rely on
more complicated ideas, such as information asymmetry. These models
sometimes fail because they make predictions that are inconsistent with
contract law. But more often they fail because they are indeterminate. The
models incorporate variables that cannot be measured, and to which one
cannot with any confidence attach general ranges or distributions.
To repeat one example, recall that the choice between the Hadley rule
and the rule of expansive liability depends, among many other things, on
the shape of the distribution of buyer valuations. If, in terms of numbers of
58. E.g., Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should
Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 77, 90 (1993)
(finding acceptance-by-silence doctrines' efficiency to be "imperfect at best").
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buyers or the magnitudes of their valuations, the distribution is lopsided
toward low valuations, then the Hadley rule is more likely to be superior.
No one has tried to determine the shape of this distribution through
empirical research, and indeed it is hard to imagine how this could be done.
It is also foreign to the fact-finding activities of courts and legislatures.
(One must also fix the relevant population, take a stab at guessing the cost
of communicating, and so forth.) Accordingly, it might be best to assume
that the distribution is uniform or normal, in which case neither rule is
superior.
A further point is that the descriptive approach has not been fruitful in
the way that it is in other areas of economics. In these other areas, the thing
to be explained is always partly hidden. It makes sense to develop a
hypothesis because in the process of testing it one learns new things about
the world, resulting in a productive dialectic between theory and data. By
contrast, the thing to be explained by the economic analysis of contract
law-contract doctrine-is known, or thought to be known. And although
at one time some scholars thought that outcomes of cases might diverge
from contract doctrine, with the outcomes reflecting efficiency-in which
case, generating and testing hypotheses would make sense-today this view
has few adherents.59 Judges have no reason to describe doctrine in a way
that misrepresents the outcomes of cases.
Rather than arguing that their models explain contract doctrine, most
authors argue that their models can be used to criticize or defend contract
doctrine. But the normative weaknesses of their models follow as a matter
of course. Simple models do not justify legal reform because these models
exclude relevant variables. Complex models do not justify legal reform
because the optimal rule depends on empirical conditions that cannot be
observed.60
One might respond that even if economic models cannot generate a
determinate optimal contract law, they helpfully identify the costs and
benefits of different legal rules. Before the economic analysis of
expectation damages and specific performance, a court trying to decide
whether to push the doctrine in one direction or the other had little to go on.
Economic analysis identified factors of which judges should take account,
factors that include the cost of renegotiation and the advantages of
permitting breach. Even if economic analysis cannot detemaine the
magnitude of these costs and benefits, and the extent to which they offset or
59. There has, however, been a recent effort to defend this proposition. See Fred S.
McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 176-84 (1999).
60. Others have made similar observations about normative law and economics. See, e.g.,
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Constrained Optimization: Corporate Law and the Maximization of Social
Welfare, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW,
supra note 3, at 87, 112-13.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112: 829
Economic Analysis of Contract Law
interact with each other, the judge who knows about them is more likely to
make a wise decision than a judge who does not.
This defense has an air of plausibility but also distressingly open-ended
and unambitious implications. The last decade has witnessed a piling on of
relevant factors, but no increasing clarity about the function of contract law,
and a wise judge might, in order to avoid paralysis, simply ignore them. But
the scholarship itself is mute about its own weaknesses. Part III will provide
some methodological reasons for skepticism. Before we get there, however,
we can gain additional insight by examining the literature on incomplete
contracts.
II. THE THEORY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
The literature on incomplete contracts diverges from the law-and-
economics literature, though they overlap in many ways. The theory of
incomplete contracts was motivated primarily by descriptive curiosity about
the nature of private contracting, not about contract law. As a result,
contract law is usually treated in an exceptionally simple manner, as a
system that specifically enforces contractual terms when the underlying
behavior can be verified by courts. 61 This assumption enables scholars to
focus on the parties' choice of contractual form. By contrast, law and
economics generally assumes that parties choose simple contracts-
contracts with a fixed price and quantity and sometimes a liquidated
damages clause-and focuses on the effect of different legal rules on
contractual behavior.
The incomplete contracts literature poses the following question to law
and economics: Why would rational parties choose noncontingent contracts
when more sophisticated contracts would enable parties to achieve better
results? And if parties did choose more sophisticated contracts, why would
courts need to do anything other than enforce the terms of these contracts?
If courts only enforced the terms of contracts, much of contract doctrine,
and much of the law-and-economics literature, would be irrelevant.
The following discussion of the theory of incomplete contracts serves
two purposes. First, it allows us to examine whether the descriptive failure
of law and economics is the result of economic methodology in general, or
61. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation is
generally considered the seminal article, though the literature has roots in Williamson's work, My
reference to the literature on "incomplete contracts" is intended to encompass articles that are
formally based on complete contract models but are concerned with the question of why contracts
are incomplete, and not just articles that include transaction costs as an element in the model.
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of the law-and-economics approach in particular. Second, it sheds light on
the methodological difficulties hidden in the concept of transaction costs.
A. Premises and Basic Results
The incomplete contracts literature focuses on two of the kinds of
incentives we have been discussing: the incentive to invest (or "rely") and
the incentive to perform or breach. An efficient or "first best" contract does
two things: It ensures that (say) Seller performs when her cost is less than
Buyer's valuation, and not otherwise ("efficient trade"), and it ensures that
Buyer (and/or Seller) invests the right amount ("efficient investment").
As we have seen, there is a tension between efficient trade and efficient
investment. A simple way of ensuring efficient trade requires Seller to pay
Buyer's valuation if she does not perform. For example, under the rule of
expectation damages, if Seller fails to perform, she must pay Buyer's
valuation. Thus, she performs if and only if her cost is less than Buyer's
valuation, the condition for efficient trade. However, Buyer will expect to
receive his valuation whether performance occurs (in which case he gets the
good) or not (in which case he gets damages equal to his valuation).
Expecting to receive his valuation in both states of the world, Buyer will
overinvest.62
All of this should be familiar from our discussion of the law and
economics of remedies. The difference between the two literatures is in the
next step. Where law and economics evaluates alternative legal rules
according to their impact on the efficiency of contractual behavior, the
incomplete contracts literature analyzes how the parties might design their
contract in order to achieve efficiency. If Seller and Buyer are rational, they
will want to prevent Buyer's overinvestment, with the parties sharing the
surplus that comes from eliminating this inefficiency. They can do so
through correct contractual design, assuming courts will specifically
enforce it.
63
The simplest solution would be to write a contract that says that the
parties must trade if v > c, and that Buyer must make optimal investment r.
If the court could observe the valuations and the investment, then it could
use specific performance or a penalty in order to force the parties to engage
in efficient behavior. But then we would have a complete contract, and such
contracts, the argument goes, are never used. In fact, contracts are
62. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
63. A few authors have also examined rules such as expectation damages, but they produce
optimal incentives only under narrow conditions. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein,
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 478, 495
(1996).
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incomplete, because transaction costs prevent the parties from putting all
relevant, that is, value-maximizing, obligations in the contract.
The literature stipulates that transaction costs mean that the investment
is not verifiable by a court, so the parties gain nothing by putting the
optimal investment in the contract. For various reasons,64 this assumption is
thought to be a more satisfactory way of capturing the concept of
transaction costs than, say, stipulating that there is a cost to writing an
obligation down or that the parties must write fixed price or noncontingent
contracts-the two preferred strategies in the law-and-economics literature.
In any event, arguments about damages rules in the law-and-economics
literature probably do not turn much on exactly how transaction costs are
characterized.6 5
Even if the investment is nonverifiable, the parties could design a
contract that provides efficient incentives. The contract would give Buyer
the right to set the price at the time of performance and make an offer to
Seller.66 Seller would have the right to reject the transaction (and receive
liquidated damages, assumed for the sake of the example to be zero) or to
accept the transaction and accept the price announced by Buyer, in which
case Buyer must accept delivery at that price.
This contract would achieve first-best efficiency. To see why, suppose
first that v > c. Buyer will set the price equal to (or slightly higher than)
Seller's cost, which Buyer observes. If Buyer set the price lower than
Seller's cost, Seller would refuse to trade, and Buyer would gain nothing.
But Buyer has no reason to set the price higher than Seller's cost, which
would only reduce Buyer's own return. Thus, Buyer sets the price equal to
c. But if v < c, Buyer will set the price at some low level in order to prevent
Seller from demanding trade, for Buyer does not want to receive less than
he pays. Seller will thus trade if and only if v > c, so the conditions for
efficient trade are met.
When Buyer makes his investment, he knows that he will receive the
goods only if v > c, and not otherwise. Thus, Buyer makes his investment
with an eye to obtaining a return only in the performance state of the world.
Indeed, Buyer will obtain the full residual of the investment because he will
64. See, e.g., Ilya Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete
Contracts, 66 REv. ECON. STUD. 57, 72-73 (1999).
65. The assumption that investments are not verifiable would not, for example, undermine
Shavell's arguments about the relative efficiency properties of expectation and reliance damages,
see Shavell, supra note 11, at 147, but would undermine Cooter's argument that the optimal
damage measure is the amount that would compensate the victim if efficient investment had
occurred, see Cooter, supra note 12, at 14.
66. I follow the discussion in Benjamin E. Hennalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial
Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of incomptete
Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230 (1993).
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set price equal to c. Thus, Buyer has the incentive to engage in efficient
investment.
The contract's trick, in this case, is to give the party with the investment
decision the residual from trade. As a result, the party has the correct
incentives both to trade and to invest. The other party, Seller, must of
course be compensated for her expected costs, and an ex ante transfer from
Buyer to Seller accomplishes this task.
This is only the first step in a literature that has become very lengthy
and complicated. Authors have discussed such problems as two-sided
investment, where Buyer can increase his valuation and Seller can reduce
her cost;6 7 cooperative investment, where Buyer can reduce Seller's cost
and Seller can increase Buyer's valuation;68 third party effects; 69 and so
forth.
The most interesting thing about these models is that they predict that
contracts will contain descriptions not of "physical" contingencies but of
the bargaining procedures that parties must follow at the time of
performance. Lawyers think of contracts as either providing absolute
obligations (Seller must deliver widgets by December I st) or conditional
obligations, with the conditions referring to events that occur in the world
such as a strike or price change (Seller must deliver widgets unless Seller
experiences labor difficulties, etc.). In models of incomplete contracts, the
bargaining procedures specified in the predicted contracts are designed to
force parties to divulge, and act efficiently on the basis of, their realized
valuations, Seller's cost, and Buyer's value, and so references to events in
the world are unnecessary. If Seller suffers a strike, for example, and her
costs rise above Buyer's valuation, Seller will exercise an option to pay
money rather than produce and deliver the goods. The contract does not
need to refer explicitly to Seller's obligations in case of a strike. Because
the parties can foresee that their valuations might change, and can design
bargaining procedures that elicit efficient behavior (or behavior no more
inefficient than that which would occur under a simpler fixed price
contract), they do not have to write down countless contingencies in their
contract. For this reason, the guiding premise of law and economics, that
67. Philippe Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, 62
ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); Tai-Yeong Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and
Risk Sharing, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 1031 (1991). For a survey, see Klaus M. Schmidt, Contract
Renegotiation and Option Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW, supra note 5, at 432.
68. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1999).
69. See infra Section II.C.
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transaction costs render contracts incomplete and justify court provision of
default rules, seems too strong.70
And yet the incomplete contracts literature does not provide a
promising alternative. The contracts that the models predict do not exist in
the world. Instead, we see simple fixed price contracts or contracts that are
conditional on a relatively small number of real world contingencies.
Intuitively, the problem with the predicted contracts is that they are too
complex for parties to design.7 1 To write such contracts, parties would need
to imagine their bargaining position if a breach should occur, and then work
their way via backward induction to the optimal terms of the contract.
People are not very good at backward induction. Yet the rationality
assumptions of economics hold that they can do it perfectly.72 This problem
has led to some discussion among economists about whether a theory of
contracts can avoid relying on a model of bounded rationality,73 an issue to
which I will return in Part IV.
B. Freedom of Contract and Asymmetric Information:
The Penalty Doctrine
The incomplete contracts literature was motivated by the desire to
explain contracting, not contract law; it is a branch of industrial
organization, not of law and economics. But authors writing in this tradition
have tried to explain some contract doctrines, and their efforts are worth
examining because they shed light on the law-and-economics literature.
Hermalin and Katz show that as long as parties are symmetrically
informed, courts cannot increase welfare by modifying, or refusing to
enforce, contractual terms.74 The logic should be familiar by now, and is
indeed identical to longstanding defenses of freedom of contract. Parties
have more information than courts about their preferences, and even if
courts can obtain superior information ex post, at the time of performance
or dispute, the parties will anticipate this behavior and design their contracts
70. For similar skepticism, on methodological and empirical grounds, see Schwartz,
Incomplete Contracts, supra note 24. For example, if transaction costs were the cost of describing
obligations for future states of the world, we would probably observe more complete contracts
than we do. Id. at 277.
71. For a discussion, see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design
and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 122-25 (2000).
72. See George J. Mailath, Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary
Game Theory, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1347 (1998).
73. Oliver Hart, Is "Bounded Rationality" an Important Element of a Theory oflnstitutions?,
146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 696, 700-01 (1990); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 134-35 (1999); Eric Maskin &
Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83, 107-
08 (1999); Segal, supra note 64, at 74.
74. Hermalin & Katz, supra note 66, at 245.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
accordingly. Parties might, for example, leave the price term blank, to be
filled in by the court ex post. But parties would not want a court to change
the price term, or any other contractual term, based on its own judgment
about what is ex post efficient.
If Hermalin and Katz are correct, then the instances where contract law
does authorize courts to interfere with contract terms become a puzzle. The
penalty doctrine is just one example, as we saw above, and indeed Hermalin
and Katz criticize the penalty doctrine for the usual reasons.
Hermalin and Katz's argument is based on the assumption that the
parties are symmetrically informed when they enter the contract. This
assumption is not always true, and they acknowledge that if the parties are
asymmetrically informed, judicial restrictions on contracts could increase
welfare. Indeed, Hermalin made just such an argument with another
coauthor three years earlier.75 In the later article, however, Hermalin backs
away from the asymmetry information argument.
In the earlier article, Aghion and Hermalin show that when the parties
are asymmetrically informed, "legal restrictions on private contracts can
enhance efficiency," as their title puts it.76 The argument is best made by
example. Imagine that a contractor has private information about the
likelihood that it will perform a project on time. There are two types of
contractors: The "good" type is more likely to perform on time than the
"bad" type is. Buyers prefer good types to bad types, and so good types
want to distinguish themselves from bad types. They do so by offering to
pay an extremely high late fee or penalty if the performance is late. The bad
type might mimic this signal, or not, but in either event the equilibrium, in
which one or both types agree to the penalty, can be inferior to an
equilibrium in which courts refuse to enforce penalties so that neither party
can credibly agree to them.
77
If we take this argument seriously, we should apply it not only to
remedial terms. The same logic applies to the price term or, indeed, any
other term of a contract. The contracts that emerge as a result of asymmetric
information are simply inefficient contracts-it's not just that one term is
inefficient, and the rest of the contract is efficient once that inefficient term
is severed-and courts should refuse to enforce them even when a penalty
clause is not activated by a breach.
To see why, imagine an employer who prefers educated applicants not
because she cares about their education but because she believes that people
75. Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can
Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990).
76. Id. at 381.
77. The conclusion depends on the parameters of the model. Under some parameters, the
separation of the types is superior to pooling; under other parameters, the opposite is the case.
Aghion and Hermalin's point is that an inefficient equilibrium without judicial interference is
possible, not certain. See id. at 399.
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who graduate from college work harder than those who do not. The
employer offers two employment packages, a low salary for those without
diplomas, and a high salary for those with diplomas. Because a potential job
applicant's decision to obtain an education has an external effect-it
increases or reduces the employer's information about the quality of other
potential applicants-the resulting equilibrium could involve inefficient
signaling. For that reason, courts or legislatures might want to prohibit the
employer's discriminatory behavior. 78 The Aghion and Hermalin argument
implies that courts should scrutinize all contracts for inefficiency, and not
just liquidated damages terms.
79
Aghion and Hermalin, then, cannot distinguish the common law's
treatment of remedial terms and non-remedial terms such as price terms. As
a descriptive theory, it is a failure. As a normative theory, it is also not
successful, as it assumes that courts have sufficient information to
distinguish signaling equilibria where judicial intervention will increase
welfare, and other equilibria where it will not. It is for this reason that
Hermalin and Katz back away from the conclusions of Aghion and
Hermalin. The former article, as I noted, expresses skepticism about the
ability of courts to improve on parties' contracts even when asymmetric
information is present. This is another descriptive failure because Hermalin
and Katz cannot explain judicial restrictions on remedial terms.
C. Freedom of Contract and Externalities: The Penalty Doctrine Again
When two parties design a contract, they will choose terms that are
optimal for themselves; they will not take account of the interests of third
parties who might be affected by the contract. But there are such third
parties. Consider a contract in which Seller must pay Buyer liquidated
damages if Seller breaches. If liquidated damages are set very high, they
might interfere with the effort of a third party (TP) to purchase the good
from Seller, even though TP might value the good more than Buyer does.
To understand why, imagine that different potential TPs have different
valuations. Among those who value the good more than Buyer does, some
value it slightly more and some value it considerably more. When Seller
and Buyer agree to relatively high liquidated damages, the latter clause
prevents the low-value TPs from buying the goods (Seller won't sell to
78. The diploma example is taken from A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 14-15
(1974).
79. I am puzzled by Ayres's response to this argument. Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract
Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 889-90 (2003). Information asymmetry is the standard
justification for regulation of the insurance market, and regulation always involves the imposition
of mandatory terms and other restrictions. Aghion and Hermalin themselves use the example of
mandatory employment benefits to illustrate their argument. Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 76,
at 401-03. I use the diploma example only because it is famous.
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them because she has to pay high liquidated damages if she does), but it
also enables Seller to extract a very high price from the high-value TPs,
who must pay an amount at least as high as the already high liquidated
damages. Under plausible conditions, Buyer and Seller jointly gain more by
extracting the surplus from the high-value TPs than they lose by failing to
sell to the low-value TPs. But this is inefficient, and the law should deter
such behavior by refusing to enforce high liquidated damages provisions.
80
This inefficiency disappears if renegotiation is possible: Ex post, the
three parties will renegotiate so that TP will end up with the good, and
efficient trade is achieved. But then the inefficiency shifts to the parties'
investment incentives. The parties will choose inefficiently high liquidated
damages to improve Seller's bargaining position vis-A-vis TP. Seller will
use this bargaining power to extract some of the surplus generated by TP's
high valuation. But this means that Seller and Buyer jointly enjoy a return
on, say, an investment in Buyer's valuation even in the state of the world in
which TP, not Buyer, acquires the good. So Buyer will overinvest
81
Do these arguments show that the penalty doctrine is efficient? They do
show that, under certain conditions, enforcement of a liquidated damages
clause can produce negative externalities. But the arguments do not travel
the distance from this modest observation, to the conclusion that the penalty
doctrine is justified. Indeed, the fit is poor. The penalty doctrine does not
incorporate any of the variables identified in the literature: The cost of
renegotiation, the distribution of valuations among potential TPs, the
incentives to overinvest, and so forth. Further, the penalty doctrine
effectively substitutes expectation damages for the invalid liquidated
damages provision, but the literature we have been discussing does not
establish that expectation damages are optimal.82 Finally, parties can harm
TPs in the way we have examined even without using liquidated damages,
simply by overinvesting, which raises the expectation damages that the
breacher would have to pay.83 If courts care about efficiency and can detect
this kind of strategic behavior, they should limit expectation damages. If
they care about efficiency and cannot detect this kind of strategic behavior,
they should not necessarily subject liquidated damages clauses to special
scrutiny.
80. See Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An
Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 280, 282-83 (1992).
81. See Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated
Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 180, 182-83 (1995).
82. See Chung, supra note 80, at 299.
83. See Tai-Yeong Chung, Commitment Through Specific Investment in Contractual
Relationships, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1057 (1998).
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D. Summary
Our diversion through the literature on incomplete contracts has taken
us through formidable terrain. This literature is flourishing, and I do not
consider myself knowledgeable enough to criticize it.84 Instead, I want to
make a few points about its relevance for understanding contract law.
First, so far the literature has failed to predict the content of either
contracts or legal doctrines such as the penalty doctrine. 85 Like the law-and-
economics literature, the incomplete contracts literature founders on the
ambiguity of contractual behavior and the difficulty of empirical
investigation of this behavior. With no empirical basis for endorsing some
assumptions and rejecting others, the models tend toward indeterminacy.
Second, if the literature has any normative implications, they are that
courts should always specifically enforce all terms of every contract.
Although we have seen highly stylized arguments that information
asymmetries and externalities might provide reasons for judicial
intervention, these arguments depend on implausible assumptions about the
amount of information that is available to judges. Thus, we are left with a
sterile normative defense of freedom of contract, one that is closely tied to
its premises that parties know more about their interests than courts do.
Third, the problems with the literature suggest methodological
complications for the theory of contract law. The literature takes more
seriously than law and economics the premise that parties are rational, and
permits them to design complicated contracts. But the premise of full
rationality does not seem right, for it predicts contractual structures that
bear little resemblance to the contracts designed by real parties. We will
discuss these problems more fully in Section III.B.
84. But it should be noted that the literature is not free from controversy. Maskin and Tirole
argue that if parties can commit not to renegotiate, the nonverifiability assumption does not
explain the existence of incomplete contracts: Parties will use the same kind of contract regardless
of whether the investment is verifiable. Maskin & Tirole, supra note 73, at 84. Hart and Moore
reply by showing that if parties cannot commit not to renegotiate, nonverifiability does matter
under certain conditions. Hart & Moore, supra note 73, at 116. The debate thus turns on whether
parties can commit not to renegotiate, about which neither set of authors is able to marshal a
decisive argument.
85. Or, for another example, courts are not likely to order parties to send messages (for
example, name a price or pay a penalty) as required by some proposed contractual devices, such
as that in Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 24, at 281. We don't know this for sure,
however, as these devices are not used, and thus are not the subject ofjudicial orders.
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III. WHY ECONOMICS FAILS To EXPLAIN CONTRACT LAW
A. The Problem of Methodological Indeterminacy
Richard Craswell has taken philosophical approaches to contract law to
task for failing to provide fine-grained explanations of contract doctrine.
86
He points out that philosophical theories might explain in a general way
why promises should be enforced-typically, by restating the moral
intuition that promises should be kept, and then assigning the government a
role in encouraging people to keep them-but never explain the details of
doctrine. A theory that people should keep their promises does not tell us
whether expectation damages, reliance damages, specific performance, or
some other remedy is the appropriate response when a contract is broken.
Indeed, when philosophers turn to these matters, they usually engage in
implicit economic analysis or make assertions about the role of custom or
other factors that are unrelated to their theories.
87
Craswell's critique is methodological, not substantive. He argues that
even if the philosophical theories capture some aspect of the truth about
why contracts are enforced, they have no determinate implications for the
phenomena that their authors purport to study-the doctrines, or the vast
majority of the doctrines, of contract law. Although Craswell does not
assert that economic analysis avoids this methodological problem, many
readers will understand him to be implicitly making this claim. One cannot
avoid being impressed by the contrast between the large and ingenious
economic body of work on default rules, and the small and vapid body of
work produced by philosophers.
But even if we accept Craswell's critique of philosophical theories of
contract law, we must still ask whether economics really enjoys any
advantages. By now, the answer should be familiar. Economists have
proposed some models of contract behavior that make determinate but
wrong predictions about the law. These models avoid Craswell's charge of
indeterminacy, but they are still wrong. Determinate but wrong predictions
enjoy a little more intellectual respectability than indeterminate predictions,
but they get us not much closer to an understanding of contract law.
Economists have proposed other models of contract behavior that make
predictions that are indeterminate. These models enjoy some intellectual
advantages over the philosophical theories, for they would enable us to
make complex and interesting predictions about contract law if we had
86. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L REv. 489 (1989).
87. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986).
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sufficient information about empirical conditions. But because we do not
have such information, and it is-in my view, though others might
disagree-unlikely that we ever would, the complex economic theories do
not get us much closer to an understanding of contract law than the
philosophical theories do.
Because this state of affairs could change with further research, one
should not discount a renaissance in the law and economics of contracts.
But another view is that theory and doctrine are mismatched, operating at
different levels of generality. Welfare economics might be able to provide
persuasive reasons for the superiority of a free market to, say, a planned
economy. A free market can function only if people can trade, and trading
almost always requires the making of binding promises. But there are many
ways that promises can be made binding: through the operation of ordinary
reputational mechanisms, through the creation of institutions like firms and
trading associations that establish commitment mechanisms for members,
and through contract law. And then there are many different rules of
contract law that will be equally good at enabling people to make binding
promises.88 Specific performance is about the same as damages; literalistic
interpretation is about the same as purposive interpretation. Individual
contract doctrines, then, could be like rules of the road: sufficient as long
as, within limits, everyone obeys them, and thus not susceptible to
prediction on the basis of fine-grained theories of optimal interaction.
B. The Problem of Rationality
The economic scholarship on contract law purports to assume that
individuals are rational in the sense of neoclassical economics. Their
preferences obey certain consistency requirements, and their cognitive
capacity is infinite. But on inspection, the nature of the rationality
assumptions made by this scholarship is not so clear.
If individuals were rational, with no cognitive limits, and if transaction
costs were zero, the role of contract law would be simple and uninteresting.
Parties would foresee every possible future state of the world, and-the
story goes-their contract would describe each party's obligation in each of
these possible future states. For example, a contract for the sale of widgets
would describe Seller's obligation if the cost of widgets increases or
declines, and could make Seller's obligation turn on whether Seller invested
in the right way, and so forth. Courts would specifically enforce the terms
of the contract. In general conditions, efficiency would be obtained.
88. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in TiE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25, 26 (F.H. Buckley
ed., 1999).
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Economic analysis of contract law assumes that contracts cannot be
designed to describe every future state of the world. The usual statement is
that transaction costs prevent the parties from achieving such a detailed and
complex contract. Some authors seem to mean the cost of negotiating and
writing a contract; other authors seem to refer to cognitive limits of the
parties, which include the inability to foresee future events and maybe
something more. 89 In any event, one needs some such assumption to get the
economic analysis of contract law off the ground; if the parties entered
complete contracts, the law would not need to supply default terms such as
expectation damages. Instead, the parties would choose expectation
damages whenever they anticipated the need, namely, when they wanted to
give the promisor the option to perform or pay a sum of money to the
promisee.
Let us examine the two main ways that authors use the idea of
transaction costs. The first approach assumes that parties are rational but
that entering a contract involves some special cost. Some authors assume
that this cost refers to time spent negotiating or the time and materials
needed to draft a document. 9 Others assume that the cost results from
problems of asymmetric information, and, in particular, the inability of a
court to verify a subset of the contract-related actions in which the parties
engage. 91 As discussed in Part II, rational parties would minimize these
costs by entering contracts that incorporate complex ex post bargaining
mechanisms. Yet there is little evidence that such mechanisms are used in
real contracts.
This problem is less clear in the law-and-economics literature than in
the incomplete contracts literature, but that is only because the law-and-
economics models constrain the types of contracts that parties may enter
rather than formally modeling the transaction cost. The models generally
permit parties to choose prices and quantities in noncontingent contracts,
and not to choose contracts that stipulate ex post bargaining procedures,
though these are likely to be superior. One defense of the methodological
approach of law and economics is that the latter contracts are too complex
to be useful, so it is a justified simplification to assume that only fixed price
contracts are available to parties.
This brings us to the second approach to the idea of transaction costs,
which is, in fact, to treat it as a metaphor for bounded rationality, the idea
that parties are rational to the extent permitted by limits on cognitive
capacity. 92 Although law-and-economics scholars rarely put their argument
in this way, the assumption is reflected, as just noted, in the modeling
89. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 100, 236, 240.
90. E.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 16, at 93.
91. Like investment levels. See Hart & Moore, supra note 61.
92. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 61, at 21.
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device of permitting parties to choose only noncontingent contracts. 93 To
understand the problem with this strategy, consider the common claim that
default rules should be designed to give a party an incentive to reveal
information about the party's cost or valuation. If "transaction costs,"
meaning bounded rationality, prevent the parties from choosing a
sophisticated contract in light of future events, then they should also
prevent parties from anticipating the effect of legal rules (which would be
applied only in the contingent future) on the simple contract that they
design. Instead, the model simultaneously assumes that individuals can
foresee remote events and make complex calculations (otherwise they
would not be motivated by the default rule to release information) and
cannot engage in a perfect cognitive response (otherwise the cost of
entering the bargain would be zero). The assumptions are jointly
implausible.
94
Economists reject bounded rationality arguments for two reasons. The
first is methodological: They cannot agree on a standard, mathematically
tractable formulation of bounded rationality. This might be a good reason
for economists, but it is a bad reason for lawyers. The second is empirical:
If the rationality assumptions of economics are close enough to the
reasoning of individuals, or to the institutionalized reasoning implemented
by firms, then the conclusions of the economic models are also good
enough for predictive and normative purposes. My view is that the failure
of contracts to include the mechanisms identified by the incomplete
contracts literature is evidence that the rationality assumptions are not good
enough. Others might disagree, claiming either that transaction costs-that
is, high writing costs, severe information asymmetries, etc.-explain the
absence of these mechanisms, or that better modeling will lead to different
conclusions in the future. This seems to me a dodge, especially in the
absence of an empirical test of the role of transaction costs in preventing the
use of mechanisms. 95 But it cannot be dismissed out of hand. The question,
then, is whether one should have optimism or pessimism about future
research.
93. 1 do not mean that the authors self-consciously made this modeling choice as a way of
capturing bounded rationality. I mean that they usually do not explicitly model transaction costs
as, for example, the cost of drafting the contract and, instead, treat transaction costs as an
(informal) explanation for why they assume that parties can choose only the contract price and
quantity (and sometimes a liquidated damages provision). E.g., Shavell, supra note 11. Even when
a variable is used to refer to a transaction or communication cost in a formal model, the parties are
constrained in their choice of contractual form. E.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note
16, at 108.
94. A similar point has been made about the incomplete contracts literature. See Maskin &
Tirole, supra note 73, at 84; Segal, supra note 64, at 74.
95. But, of course, if there are no contracts that use these mechanisms, the techniques of
econometrics are hardly necessary.
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C. A Way Out?
One way out of this impasse involves greater consideration as to what
parties can realistically be expected to foresee. Contrast the efficient breach
theory and the Hadley theory. If Seller experiences higher than expected
costs and would like to avoid the deal, she would probably consult a
lawyer. The lawyer would tell her that if she breaches the contract, she will
probably pay expectation damages. Comparing the cost of performance and
the expectation damages, Seller will decide whether or not to perform. This
decision seems well within the cognitive abilities of an ordinary Seller.
By contrast, the Hadley theory applies to a decisionmaking process that
occurs well before performance. At the time of contracting, Buyer (for
example) must anticipate that Seller might breach rather than perform; that
Seller must pay damages if she breaches; that these damages depend on the
valuations of other buyers as well as Buyer's revelation of his private
valuation; that Seller will (or maybe won't) anticipate these damages when
deciding how much care to use when performing; that Seller will (or maybe
won't) use Buyer's information to price discriminate; and so on. This chain
of reasoning seems likely to exceed the cognitive capacities of an ordinary
Buyer, whether or not a lawyer is consulted.
One way out of the impasse, then, requires incorporation of cognitive
limitations into a theory of the relationship between contract law and
contract-related behavior, so that one can distinguish incentives that are
likely to influence behavior, and those that are too remote to influence
behavior. No widely accepted theory of bounded rationality exists,
however. The likelihood that such a theory could be developed is discussed
in Section V.D.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON CONTRACTS
SCHOLARSHIP AND LAW
A. The Influence of Economics on Contracts Scholarship
Defenders of economic analysis of contract law point to the significant
influence of economics on contracts scholarship. Indeed, this influence can
be documented in many ways. Economic analysis played almost no role in
contracts scholarship prior to 1970, whereas it has played a dominant role
in much of the contracts scholarship published in the major law reviews in
the 1990s. It has influenced some of the analysis in the treatises. It shows
up in the casebooks. Economic articles on contracts are frequently cited in
noneconomics articles. And contracts scholars at the top law schools are
frequently identified with the law-and-economics approach.
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But this rosy picture does not tell the whole story. The most influential
economic articles, with one exception, were published in the 1970s and
early 1980s. The exception, Ayres and Gertner's 1989 article on default
rules, is usually cited for the useful distinction between majoritarian and
penalty defaults and not for the economic analysis of this distinction. On
the whole, economics-of-contracts articles published in the last fifteen years
are cited no more frequently than noneconomics articles are.
96
Contract-law casebooks and treatises show the influence of economics,
but it is the influence of pre-1980 economics. Most casebooks and treatises
mention the idea of efficient breach, but not the equally important idea of
efficient reliance.97 Casebooks generally treat the economic approach as an
exotic "perspective," as an object at which to marvel, and not as the
underlying logic of contract law. To be sure, most casebook authors are
noneconomists, but what is important is that these authors have apparently
concluded that greater economic content would not expand the market share
of their casebooks.
98
B. The Influence of Economics on Contract Doctrine
The influence of economic analysis on contract law is harder to discern.
Let us start with the common law. Judicial opinions occasionally cite
economic articles, and occasionally use economic concepts such as
transaction costs and risk aversion. But it is hard to find cases where the
judges self-consciously rely on an economic argument in order to justify a
result. One such case is the Van Wagner case,99 which relies heavily on
Anthony Kronman's analysis of specific performance.'0 0 Many opinions
96. This conclusion is based on a regression of the annual citations of articles published since
1980 in leading law journals (California, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern,
NYU, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Texas, UCLA, and Yale) and faculty-edited journals (Journal of
Law and Economics, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, and Journal of Legal
Studies) on a dummy variable equal to one if the article uses economic analysis, and zero
otherwise. The mean annual citation for economics articles was 3.8 (71 articles); for
noneconomics articles, it was 4.1 (52 articles). If you exclude all the faculty-edited journals,
however, then economics articles are cited more often at a statistically significant level; but if you
include the Journal of Legal Studies alone, then they are not. There are many ways that one could
conduct this test, and for that reason I can conclude only that citation evidence does not exclude
the hypothesis that economics articles are no more influential than noneconomics articles.
97. A Westlaw search of Farnsworth's treatise yields the following results: "efficicn!" = 32
results; "economic!" = 113 results; "transaction! cost!" - 5 results; "Coase" = 2 results. The
"economic!" search caught many concepts unrelated to economic analysis, such as "economic
waste."
98. The Scott and Leslie casebook is the exception; compare the contracts casebooks by
Barnett, Dawson, and Eisenberg. Compare ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT
LAW AND THEORY (2d ed. 1993), with RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE
(1995), JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (7th ed. 1998), and LON L.
FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (6th ed. 1996).
99. Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 760 (N.Y. 1986).
100. Kronman, supra note 14.
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cite Posner and Rosenfield's article on the impossibility doctrine, but
almost always for the proposition that contracts shift risk, an idea that
predates economic analysis by many decades. The notes to the Restatement
contain only a handful of references to economic ideas.1 °1
To examine the influence of economic analysis on contract doctrine
more systematically, I read the state and federal court opinions that cite an
economics article that appeared in a major law review or faculty-edited law
journal after 1980. Only thirty-six such opinions were issued. Of these, few
discussed rather than cited the article, and none was clearly influenced by
an article. 1
02
Economic analysis has also had little influence, as far as I can tell, on
statutory and regulatory law. Statutes and regulations in the 1970s
incorporated common-law developments that economic analysis criticized,
and although the consumer-protection movement crested in the 1970s,
economics did not spur deregulation of the consumer-product and
consumer-finance markets as it did for so many other markets such as
trucking and air travel.
V. THE FUTURE
If the limits of economic analysis are becoming visible, can some other
methodology take us beyond them? A brief survey of the other contenders
provides grounds for concern.' 1 3
A. Philosophy
For a long time, legal scholars have sought a philosophical explanation
for contract law. Fuller and Perdue argued that contract law is based on
corrective justice. °4 Fried argued that contract law is based on the morality
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 48. Searches on Westlaw yielded the following results:
"efficien!" = 8 results; "economic!" = 38 results; "transaction! cost!" - 1; "Coase" = 0 results. In
fact, few of the "economic!" results were related to economic analysis (as opposed to "economic
waste," etc.).
102. Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, however, has been cited in 116 cases in the
LEXIS contracts database. A sample suggests a mix of meaningful analysis and meaningless
citation, Cooter and Ulen's textbook was cited only twice. It might be the case that economically
minded judges such as Calabresi, Easterbrook, and Posner have influenced contract doctrine, and I
have not tried to measure their influence by looking at whether other judges accept their views
about contract law. William Dodge credits the theory of efficient breach as provoking a judicial
backlash against awarding punitive damages for breach of contract. See William S. Dodge, The
Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 642-44 (1999).
103. For a more optimistic view, see ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT
LAW (1997).
104. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
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of promising.'0 5 These theories remain the most influential despite their
inadequacies. 1
0 6
Let us first consider each theory from a descriptive perspective. Fried
argues that contracts should be enforced because individuals have a moral
obligation to keep their promises. Fried's theory has the virtue of simplicity
but cannot explain the many ways that contract law refuses to enforce
promises. Unreciprocated offers, promises that lack consideration, promises
that violate the Statute of Frauds, promises that lack specific terms-all of
these promises are, in ordinary cases, not enforced. Finally, as Craswell has
pointed out, Fried's theory cannot explain the default terms the law uses to
fill out promises that otherwise are ill-defined.' 07
Fuller and Perdue argue that contracts should be enforced in order to
prevent one party, the promisor, from benefiting at the expense of the other
party. Corrective justice demands that the breaching promisor make the
promisee whole. The reliance measure is ideal for this purpose, but because
reliance costs are hard to measure and the expectation measure
approximates the reliance measure in competitive markets, the expectation
measure is the appropriate rule. But as Craswell shows, Fuller and Perdue's
theory cannot explain why the appropriate baseline for exercising corrective
justice is the promisee's position prior to the making of the promise, as
opposed to after the making of the promise.1 08 Others-notably Grant
Gilmore and Patrick Atiyah-tried to generalize Fuller and Perdue's
analysis and claimed that contract is being absorbed into tort.
109 But these
efforts have gone nowhere.
The theories fare no better when conceived as normative arguments for
the reform of contract law. As Craswell shows, they are indeterminate over
nearly all aspects of contract doctrine. 10 Fried's theory justifies the
enforcement of promises, but sheds no light on which of many remedies-
expectation damages, reliance damages, specific performance, even
nominal damages-is the right one. Fuller and Perdue's theory, as just
mentioned, cannot solve the baseline problem.
105. FRIED, supra note 3.
106. The present discussion concerns normative theories, not "analytic" or "interpretive"
theories (as Craswell uses the terms) that have been advanced by legal philosophers. For the
distinction, see Stephen Smith, An Introduction to Contract Theory (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Philosophers have goals that are different from those of
economists, see Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002), and
here I am asking only whether philosophy can succeed where economics has failed.
107. Craswell, supra note 86, at 521-23.
108. Id.
109. P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT (1990); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1995).
110. Craswell, supra note 86.
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None of this is to say that philosophy has nothing to offer contract law.
Philosophical reasoning, if not necessarily the reasoning of philosophers,
has a significant accomplishment: the critique of the "will theory" of
contract. The will theory, which derives contract doctrine from the premise
that a contract is the coming together of two wills, is not just a once popular
legal theory; it is also an intuitive, common sense approach to
understanding contract law, instinctively adopted by generation after
generation of first-year law students, and a happy target for philosophical
criticism. The celebrated critique of the will theory of the duress doctrine-
namely, contracts entered under duress and contracts entered "voluntarily"
involve the same kind of coercion-is powerful and important, and this
critique owes something to philosophical reasoning. But one must also
understand that this critique is much older than those who are credited with
it: It can be found not only in Dawson, and Hale, and Holmes, but also in
Hume and probably earlier.' 1 Basic philosophical ideas about the nature of
the will, of agreement, and of contract go back for centuries, and their
implications for contract law are well understood.
B. Psychology
Several scholars have recently argued that cognitive psychology holds
promise for explaining the law, including the law of contracts. This view
has superficial attractiveness 12 If, as I have argued, economic models of
the law are undermined by their rationality assumptions, then
psychologically accurate models of human cognition might fill in the gaps
left by the economic explanation.
Let us focus on the example of the penalty doctrine because it is the
topic of a recent debate about the value of using cognitive psychology to
understand the law. We have already seen that economics fails to explain
the penalty doctrine; can cognitive psychology?
The question is, why do courts give less deference to liquidated
damages clauses than they do to other provisions of a contract, including
choice-of-forum clauses, which will become relevant only if a dispute
arises? In response to Robert Hillman's skepticism about whether cognitive
psychology can explain this practice,"13 Jeffrey Rachlinski argues that (1)
biases that cause overoptimism justify scrutiny of liquidated damages
provisions; (2) the status quo bias (contrary to Hillman's claim) does not
111. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 525 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1978) (1740).
112. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
113. Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The
Case ofLiquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000).
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justify deference because the increased effort to bargain around the
damages rule does not necessarily eliminate the effects of overoptimism;
and (3) although aversion to ambiguity justifies deference to liquidated
damages, courts actually use this insight under the penalty doctrine by
giving more deference to liquidated damages clauses when damages are
hard to calculate (and thus ambiguous).' 
14
Even accepting these arguments, which will strike many as ad hoc,
Rachlinski cannot explain why the biases justify judicial scrutiny of
liquidated damages terms but not other terms. Breach is not the only low-
probability event that occurs within contractual relations; a contract might
make any number of obligations conditional on events that occur with a low
probability. Think of bond covenants that give creditors the right to
accelerate repayment when the debtor's asset-debt ratio falls below a
threshold, employment compensation packages that provide payoffs only
when market conditions are favorable, and sales contracts that allocate the
risk of the destruction of the goods during delivery. If parties overlook low-
probability events, then any of these provisions could be defective, but
because they are not liquidated damages provisions, courts do not subject
them to scrutiny. Indeed, Rachlinski concedes the explanatory failure of
cognitive psychology when he says that the field "might cause scholars to
question much of contract law's foundations."" 5 Rachlinski slips from a
descriptive claim to a normative claim in the face of the poor fit of
cognitive psychology and the penalty doctrine.
C. History
Historical explanations of contract law once held promise, but early
enthusiasm has given way to skepticism. Consider the attempt to link trends
in contract-law doctrine to the rise of the welfare state." 6 Scholars claimed
that the increasing informality of contract law over the last century, and
especially the rise of promissory estoppel, showed courts moving away
from laissez faire and toward statism and the enforcement of community
standards. The convenient link to other trends in political economy, and
specifically the rise of the welfare state, obscured the poor fit between the
theory and doctrinal trends."1 7 The rise of promissory estoppel, for example,
could be interpreted as reflecting judicial impatience with a formality-the
consideration doctrine-that interfered with, rather than promoted, private
114. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 762 (2000).
115. Id. at 763.
116. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); GILMORE, supra
note 109.
117. See Epstein, supra note 88, at 25.
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contracting! 18 Contract doctrine can coexist with many different political
systems, and broad trends, such as the decline of formalism, do not
necessarily reflect changes in politics or morality.
Similar criticisms apply to Simpson's argument that the eighteenth-
century shift from judicial accommodation of penalties to hostility toward
penalties was due to "social evolution" away from tolerance for the private
use of terror to the monopoly of force held by the state.' 19 Simpson argues
that once courts deprived private parties of the right to use force, the courts
vindicated their longstanding commitment to the compensation principle by
banning penalties.
The argument raises more questions than it answers. Both before and
after the "social evolution," parties depended on courts to enforce their
contracts. Before, a party could not collect a penal bond without first
obtaining a judgment from a court. The other party had a number of legal
defenses: not only full performance of the underlying promise, but such
conventional defenses as duress and impossibility. The doctrinal change did
not reflect a shift away from tolerance for private use of terror; it reflected a
shift in the degree of deference given to remedial terms in contracts.
Simpson's argument boils down to the assertion that judges stopped
deferring to remedial terms because they wanted to control remedies, but he
does not explain why they would want to treat contractually stipulated
remedies differently from other terms in the contract.
Even if we accepted the "social evolution" argument-the shift from
private to public remedies-we need to understand why judges would think
that the "compensation principle" should control remedies and thus exclude
penalties. 120 Simpson argues that judges had a longstanding belief that the
law should provide compensation (not overcompensation) for injuries. But
judges also believed that "the real function of contractual institutions is to
make sure, so far as possible, that agreements are performed." 121 Simpson
acknowledges that the two principles-compensation and respect for
agreement-are in conflict, but does not explain why the first prevailed
over the second.
Simpson's argument shares the flaws of the historical scholarship
described above-the use of macro trends to explain micro phenomena that
are consistent with other trends, the casual appeal to such long-term trends
to explain a change that occurred at a particular time, and the arbitrary
resolution of tensions between different principles or ideas in favor of one
118. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 88, at 61.
119. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 124 (1975).
120. Recall also the ambiguity of the notion of "compensation," which presupposed a
baseline. See supra text accompanying note 108. But we will assume that whatever compensation
means, a penalty requires something beyond compensation.
121. SIMPSON, supra note 119, at 123.
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rather than the other. Historical scholarship is often illuminating, and any
good theory of contract law would need to account for aspects of its
historical evolution, but thus far theories of contract law emerging from
historical research have not resolved basic puzzles about modem contract
doctrine.
D. Advances in Economics and Game Theory
I argued in Section III.C that the failures of the economic analysis of
contract law derive, in part, from the bounded rationality of individuals who
enter contracts. If people were rational, then their contracts could be
predicted. And if people's behavior could be predicted in this way, then
firm recommendations about contract doctrine could be made. But because
the models press rationality to its limits, the world falls short of the
predictions, and so the natural consequence is to incorporate cognitive
limitations into models of behavior.
The economic literature on bounded rationality is complex and large,
and I cannot do justice to it. None of the models of bounded rationality that
have been proposed has achieved canonical status, 22 and thus it is difficult
to discuss in general what bounded rationality means for contract law. An
example will illustrate the problems, and, I think, justify skepticism about
the ability of future models of bounded rationality to shed light on contract
doctrine. 
123
In the beauty contest game, the experimenter asks each member of a
group to write down a number between 0 and 100 that is, say, 2/3 of the
average number (between 0 and 100) that everyone else writes down. The
person who writes the correct answer wins a prize; if there is a tie, the prize
is divided among the people with the right answer.
Game theory-that is, game theory that assumes "unbounded"
rationality-predicts that everyone will write down 0 and share the prize.
The intuitive explanation for this prediction follows. Imagine that you are
one of the people asked to write down the number. You might start by
imagining that everyone else will pick a number at random. If so, you might
expect a uniform distribution from 0 to 100, with a mean of 50. Thus, you
would pick 2/3 of the mean, which is about 34. But then it might occur to
you that everyone will have reasoned in the same way that you have. Thus,
everyone else will have written down 34. But if everyone else has written
down 34, then you can win only by writing down 2/3 of 34, which is about
23. Yet everyone else knows this as well, so they will write down 23, and
122. E.g., David M. Kreps, Bounded Rationality, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 168.
123. For other efforts, see id. at 168-73.
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you should write down 2/3 of 23, and so on. Continuing with this reasoning,
we reach 0. If everyone chooses 0, then you can do no better than choosing
0 as well, for then you will share the prize, whereas if you choose a higher
number, you will receive nothing.
The explanation can be given more formally. If everyone chooses 0,
everyone gets a share of the prize. If one person decides to choose a number
different from 0, that person will no longer receive a share of the prize, and
thus will receive a lower payoff. No one can do better than choosing 0
given that everyone else chooses 0. The outcome 0 is what game theorists
call a Nash equilibrium: It is an outcome from which one has no incentive
to deviate, given everyone else's choice, because one cannot increase one's
payoff by deviation. 24 By contrast, if one person knows that everyone else
will choose a particular number n > 0, then that person can do better by
choosing a number different from n, namely 2/3 of n. Thus, any n > 0
cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium does a poor job predicting behavior in the initial
rounds of play. When people play the beauty contest game, typically there
is a distribution as follows. For a sufficiently large group, most or all
numbers will be chosen, with spikes around 34, 23, and perhaps 14, and
then 0.125 A natural explanation of this pattern is that some people choose
numbers randomly, or misunderstand the game; others are able to think one,
two, or three steps ahead, or even more, but it never happens that everyone
figures out, and plays, the Nash equilibrium in the initial rounds.
Aside from the empirical disconfirmation, the experiments pose a
conundrum. Suppose we imagine a perfectly rational person, X. What do
you predict that X will do? In Nash equilibrium X chooses 0, but if X is
smart (rational?) enough, X will realize that not everyone else will play the
Nash move, in which case X should choose a number greater than 0, its
magnitude depending on the distribution of cognitive ability in the
population. So our purely rational X will not act purely rationally as defined
by game theory.
What to do? One idea recently investigated by Teck-Hua Ho and his
coauthors proceeds as follows. 12 6 Imagine that a person engages in a
number of cognitive steps when thinking about how to play the beauty
contest game. In step 0, he randomly chooses a number between 0 and 100.
In step 1, he thinks that everyone else has engaged in step 0 and only step
0-that is, everyone else has chosen a number at random-and chooses
124. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 19-23 (1994).
125. See Teck-Hua Ho et al., Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in
Experimental "p-Beauty Contests, " 88 AM. ECON. REV. 947, 953-58 (1998). Their version of the
game uses a different range of numbers from the example in the text, which is simpler, but the
pattern is the same.
126. See id.
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strategically on the basis of this assumption. (In our example, he would
choose 34.) In step 2, he thinks that a fraction of the population has engaged
in step 0, and the rest has reached step 1, but none (besides himself) has
reached step 2, and he chooses accordingly. This process continues for an
arbitrary number of steps.
To predict the distribution of numbers chosen in the beauty contest
game, we assume that a portion of the population stops at step 0, another
group stops at step 1, another group stops at step 2, and so forth. To make
such a prediction, we have to decide how many steps there are, and how the
cognitive ability (the number of steps taken) is distributed among the
population, but let us suppose that we can make reasonable assumptions
about these parameters. Ho and his coauthors show that if we make such
assumptions, we will predict something close to the actual distribution-all
or most numbers being chosen, with spikes near 34, 23, and so forth, except
that there will not be a spike at 0. (If the game is repeated, however, people
will learn from their mistakes and eventually nearly everyone will play the
Nash equilibrium strategy.)
The model has some attractive features: It captures the importance of
the distribution of cognitive capacities that presumably exists in the general
population, the effect of limited cognitive capacity on choices, and the role
of learning. All of these factors must play a role in the design of contracts
and therefore in the proper judicial treatment of them. But the model does
not refine the basic intuition with which we started, that contract doctrine
might have something to do with mistake, lack of foresight, and similar
effects of cognitive limitations.
The role of a model of bounded rationality in normative analysis of
contract law is also obscure. If parties cannot foresee certain events, then
legal rules will not affect their incentives, and courts can do what they want
when those events occur. If parties can foresee the events but fail to think
about them fully and accurately, then the possibility of useful judicial
intervention remains open. But an accounting of the costs and benefits of
this intervention must await a more fully worked out theory of bounded
rationality.
E. A Return to Doctrinalism?
If interdisciplinary approaches to contract law cannot generate plausible
descriptive or normative theories, should legal scholars return to doctrinal
analysis? To answer this question, we must first be clear about what
doctrinalism means.
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The most ambitious doctrinal scholarship attempts to derive principles
from cases. Fuller and Perdue argued that a "reliance principle" explains
contract damages. 12 More recently, Eisenberg has argued that a "bargain
principle" and a "fairness principle" explain contract-enforcement
doctrines, 128 and Farnsworth has proposed "dependence" and "public
interest" principles, among many others.
129
As many have observed, cases will not yield principles that are more
general than the case outcomes themselves. The plausibility of the
principles that scholars advance always comes from their appeal to moral
commitments. The extraction of a fairness principle from the cases, rather
than a principle of fairness for litigants who have brown eyes (if such is the
case) or for litigants who have some other characteristic coextensive with
the cases in which they prevail, is always the result of an implicit appeal to
an attractive normative idea-fairness for all, rather than fairness to a
morally arbitrary group of people. Ambitious doctrinal scholarship thus
converges to a kind of moral philosophy that is especially sensitive to
judicial outcomes, 130  and is thus vulnerable to the criticisms of
philosophical analysis described in Section V.A.
Examples of authors who write in this vein include Fuller and Perdue,
who argue that the reliance principle follows from corrective justice, and
Eisenberg, who attempts to tie the bargain principle and fairness principle
to policy concerns and moral commitments. Farnsworth avoids
philosophizing or engaging in policy analysis by keeping his discussion
vague. For example, he does not explain how he resolves conflicts between
the many principles that he invokes.
13 1
A narrower kind of doctrinal analysis is nothing more than ordinary
legal analysis, in which a judge or lawyer explains whether or not a given
precedent controls the case under consideration. This kind of doctrinalism
is useful, and can be done well or poorly, but a return to this scholarship
would have to count as a defeat for the descriptive and normative
aspirations of modem legal theory. Doctrinalism does not describe or
justify the law; it is simply the use of legal materials and techniques of
reasoning to determine the outcome in a given case, or to reconcile or
criticize cases that have disparate outcomes.
127. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 104.
128. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1982).
129. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGREJTED DECISIONS
(1998).
130. That is, something like Dworkinian interpretivism.
131. For a critique of Fuller and Perdue's argument, see Richard Craswell, Against Fuller
and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000). For a critique of Farnsworth's argument, see Eric A.
Posner, Law andRegret, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (2000).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The title of this Essay is a question, not a statement, for two reasons.
First, the answer can come only with more experience. As economists and
lawyers experiment with new models and variations of old ones, they might
find better approaches to understanding contracts and contract law. The
answer might also turn out to be "sort of," depending on whether efforts to
model bounded rationality, should they succeed, ought to be considered a
vindication of economics or psychology.
Second, economics has already accomplished much, just not what its
proponents set out as the measure of success. If you look at the best work in
contracts scholarship today and compare it with the best contracts
scholarship before the 1970s, you will see many differences. One important
difference is that earlier work was methodologically sloppy. Much of this
work mixed up two separate tasks: excavating the doctrine and evaluating
it. Evaluation would often be based on poorly articulated notions of
fairness-intuitions that other commentators as well as judges might or
might not share-with either no attention to the effects of doctrine on
incentives, or casual discussion. The failure to distinguish doctrine and
policy often resulted in the displacement of the policy disagreement into
rule/standard debates. For example, the voluminous literature on the
unconscionability doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s was vague on the
incentive effects of the doctrine-with some concern about interfering with
freedom of contract, and some concern about unequal bargaining power-
and vigorous on the question whether an ambiguous standard like
unconscionability could be applied by courts as consistently as they applied
similar supposedly rule-like doctrines, such as duress.' 32 No one seemed to
understand that the rules/standard question presupposed a resolution of the
policy question.
The economic literature on the unconscionability doctrine clarified the
policy questions at stake and largely displaced the earlier literature. Its main
accomplishment was showing that the earlier policy arguments were ill-
defined, or made implausible empirical assumptions, or were inconsistent
with widely held views or other uncontroversial areas of law and policy.
Defenses of the unconscionability doctrine are now more candid and
clearer, even if they reject economic premises. The literature as a whole
proceeds at a higher level of sophistication.
Economics, then, ushered in a set of scholarly virtues that have
improved the literature. These virtues include consistency in the use of
terms, clarification of the stakes of the discussion, the distinction between
normative and positive analysis, and isolation of different incentives and
132. See, e.g., M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
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behaviors. The literature now speaks in an economic idiom, with concepts
like transaction cost, risk aversion, default rule, and efficiency substituting
for similar but vaguer notions in the earlier writings. These are important
accomplishments, and it is hard to imagine serious contract-law research in
the future that does not reflect the influence of economics.
But economics fails to explain contract law. It does not explain why
expectation damages are the standard remedy, for example, or why
liquidated damages are not always enforced. It does not explain the function
of the consideration doctrine or promissory estoppel. It does not explain
why the law sometimes encourages people to disclose information and at
other times does not.
And economics provides little normative guidance for reforming
contract law. Models that have been proposed in the literature either focus
on small aspects of contractual behavior or make optimal doctrine a
function of variables that cannot realistically be observed, measured, or
estimated. The models do give a sense of the factors that are at stake when
the decisionmaker formulates doctrine, and might give that decisionmaker a
sense of the trade-offs involved, but in the absence of information about the
magnitudes of these trade-offs-and the literature gives no sense of these
magnitudes-the decisionmaker is left with little guidance.
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